Like a Bridge over Troubled Water: Gender Quotas and Women’s Representation by Larsson, Moa
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MASTER’S THESIS 
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION  
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Like a Bridge over Troubled Water: 
Gender Quotas and Women’s 
Representation 
 
A global, cross-country quantitative analysis of the impact of 
gender quotas on changed levels of women’s representation in 
national parliaments 2001-2011 
 
 
Author: Moa Larsson 
Advisor: Marcia Grimes 
 
25-05-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
The development of women’s representation the last two decades has put pressure on research 
explaining the causes underlying high levels. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) argue that high 
levels of women’s representation have to be analysed from two ideal types, the incremental 
track and the fast track. Traditionally, women’s representation is considered to be the outcome 
of overall societal development and a measure of the countries’ gender-equality, advanced by 
the incremental track. The widespread adoption of gender quotas, however, has contributed to 
leaps in women’s representation in a broad number of under-developed and gender-unequal 
countries, advanced by the fast track. This thesis analyses the impact of three gender quota 
types (reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas) on the changed 
levels of women’s representation from 2001 to 2011. Particular attention is paid towards the 
countries’ regime types. By using statistical design and a large-N sample, the results from the 
regression analysis (OLS) suggest that reserved seats have contributed to a large increase in 
women’s representation. The most remarkable finding is that reserved seats and legislated 
candidate quotas have contributed to leaps in women’s representation in non-democratic 
regimes. The conclusions from the findings are threefold: first, the results confirm the 
importance of Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s two tracks to women’s representation. Second, 
studies of gender quotas need to consider types of quota to be able to capture the impact of 
quotas. Third, the finding highlights the importance of including the perspective of non-
democratic regimes in cross-country studies of women’s representation and gender quotas. 
 
Keywords: gender quotas, reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, voluntary party quotas, 
women’s representation, non-democratic regimes. 
 
 
 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 4 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................... 6 
2.1 The incremental vs. the fast track to women’s representation ......................................... 6 
2.2 Why women in parliament? ............................................................................................. 7 
2.2.1 Politics of presence and women’s interests ............................................................... 7 
2.2.3 Women’s representation and democracy .................................................................. 8 
2.3 Factors explaining women’s representation ..................................................................... 9 
2.3.1 The impact of structural factors on women’s representation ...................................... 10 
2.3.2 The impact of cultural factors on women’s representation ......................................... 10 
2.4 Women’s political representation ................................................................................... 10 
2.4.1 Formal representation – rules of the game .............................................................. 11 
2.4.2 Descriptive representation – does the parliament mirror the population?............... 11 
2.4.3 Substantive and symbolic representation ................................................................ 12 
2.4 Linking the dimensions of women’s representation ...................................................... 12 
2.4.1 Linking formal and descriptive representation ........................................................ 12 
2.4.2 Linking descriptive and substantive representation ................................................ 15 
2.4.3 An integrated model of representation .................................................................... 16 
2.5 Gender Quotas ................................................................................................................ 18 
2.5.1 Introducing gender quotas ....................................................................................... 18 
2.5.2 Beijing 1995 and the changed international norm .................................................. 19 
2.5.3 Critique on quotas ................................................................................................... 19 
2.6 Types of gender quotas .................................................................................................. 21 
2.6.1 Reserved seats ......................................................................................................... 21 
2.6.2 Legislated candidate quotas..................................................................................... 22 
2.6.3 Voluntary party quotas ............................................................................................ 22 
2.7 Do quotas always work? ................................................................................................ 23 
2.8 Gender Quotas and Democracy ...................................................................................... 23 
2.9 What to expect. ............................................................................................................... 26 
2.9 Research questions ......................................................................................................... 26 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 27 
3.1 Data and operationalizations .......................................................................................... 27 
3.1.1 Data sources ............................................................................................................ 27 
3.1.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES ...................................................................................... 27 
2.3.3 Reversed causality? ..................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 33 
3.2.1 Research design ....................................................................................................... 33 
3.2.2 Disposition of analysis ............................................................................................ 33 
3.2.3 Reliability ................................................................................................................ 34 
3.2.4 External validity ...................................................................................................... 34 
3.2.5 Regression analysis ................................................................................................. 35 
4. ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 36 
4.1 Section 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis .................................................. 36 
4.1.1 Dependent variable: Women’s representation ........................................................ 36 
4.1.2 Independent variables .............................................................................................. 39 
4.1.2.1 Gender Quotas ...................................................................................................... 39 
4.1.2.2 Gender Quotas and the Regime Types ................................................................. 41 
4.1.2.3 Gender Quota Types and Electoral Systems ........................................................ 42 
4.1.2.4 Structural factors as independent variables .......................................................... 44 
 2 
4.1.2.5 Cultural factors as independent variables ............................................................. 46 
4.2 Section 2: Regression analysis ....................................................................................... 47 
4.2.1 The models’ explanatory power .............................................................................. 50 
4.2.2 Impact of gender quotas .......................................................................................... 50 
4.2.2.1 Reserved seats ...................................................................................................... 50 
4.2.2.2 Legislated candidate quotas ................................................................................. 51 
4.2.3 Impact of Electoral system ...................................................................................... 53 
4.2.4 Lack of impact from structural and cultural factors ................................................ 53 
5. DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................... 54 
5.1 Which types of countries have gender quotas? .............................................................. 54 
5.2 Have gender quotas changed levels of women’s representation descriptive 
representation from 2001 to 2011? ....................................................................................... 54 
5.3 Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type? ........ 55 
6. Final words from the author ................................................................................................. 60 
7. Literature list ........................................................................................................................ 61 
8. Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 66 
8.2 Women’s representation ................................................................................................. 66 
8.2 Gender Quotas ................................................................................................................ 70 
8.3 Databases ........................................................................................................................ 73 
 
 
 
 3 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1 Number of countries with more than 30 percent women MPs (p. 5)       
Figure 2.1 Factors explaining cross-country differences in women’s representation (p.10) 
Figure 2.2 Gender quotas applied on Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s integrated model (p.17) 
Figure 4.1 Women’s representation 2011 and 2001 (p.37) 
Figure 4.2 Number of countries categorised after gender quota type (p.40) 
Figure 4.3 Level of development within the Quota types (HDI) (p.45) 
 
Table 2.1 Arguments for and against quotas (p.20) 
Table 2.2 Gender Quota Types (p.21) 
Table 4.1 Change in levels of women's representation 2001 – 2011, percentage points (p.38) 
Table 4.2 Quota Type and Regime Type (%) (p.42) 
Table 4.3 Quota type and electoral system (% countries) (p.43) 
Table 4.4 Quota Type and Religion (p.46) 
Table 4.5 Regression analysis (OLS). Dependent variable: Women’s representation in national 
parliament 2011 (% of total). (Standard errors) (p.49) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 4 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the issue of women’s under-representation in national 
parliaments was highlighted by women’s movements, international organisations, and 
political leaders worldwide. At the United Nations’ (UN) Conference in Beijing 1995, the 
participants agreed to encourage countries to adopt gender quotas on order to increase the 
levels of women’s representation. A large number of countries accepted these 
recommendations and adopted quotas. In 2001, the global average was 12.2 percent women 
members of the parliament (MPs). Ten years later gender quotas seem to have had the 
intended impact: In December 2011, the global average of women’s representation in national 
parliaments was 19.7 percent (IPU 2012).   
 
The global average increase, of seven percentage points from 2001 to 2011, is interesting 
considering women’s representation traditionally is claimed to be the outcome of overall 
societal development. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) call the traditional way of increasing 
the proportion of women MPs the incremental track to women’s representation. The 
incremental track is one of two ideal types that according to Dahlerup and Freidenvall explain 
cross-country differences in women’s representation. According to the incremental track, 
women’s representation is the outcome of a step-wise, time-consuming development where 
gender equality and the proportion of women MPs follow each other. The countries have in 
general reached certain level of democracy, and the Scandinavian countries are closest to the 
ideal type.  
 
By contrast, according to the second ideal type, the fast track, women’s representation is not 
an indication of gender equality or development, but rather the outcome of gender quotas. 
After the UN Conference in Beijing 1995, there have been a remarkable increased number of 
countries with gender quotas. The leaps of women’s representation in non-democratic regimes 
like Rwanda and Afghanistan are to a large extent explained by gender quotas. Hence, 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall suggest as a consequence from the last two decades’ increased 
number of countries having gender quotas, high levels of women’s representation require an 
understanding of which the underlying causes are. 
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The proportion of women MPs at country-level reveals an even more interesting development. 
There number of countries with more than 30 percent
1
 women MPs has increased remarkably 
the last decade:  
 
Figure 1.1 Number of countries with more than 30 percent women MPs 
 
Source: IPU 2012 
 
As shown in Figure 1.1 the number of countries having more than 30 percent women MPs is 
more than three times as many 2011 compared to 2001. In 2001 only 8 countries had more 
than 30 percent women compared to 28 countries in 2011 (IPU 2012). Most of the countries 
have some type of gender quotas. Several are non-democratic regimes.
2
  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the last decade’s development of women’s descriptive 
representation in national parliaments worldwide. The aim is to study the impact of three 
gender quota types on the changed country-levels of women MPs between 2001 and 2011. 
The thesis pays particular attention towards the countries’ regime types, as little attention is 
paid to the development in non-democratic regimes in previous research. There is only limited 
previous research analysing the impact of gender quotas categorised by types of quota using 
global, cross-country perspective. By using large-N sample this thesis to study whether 
gender quotas can act as a bridge over troubled water and enable women to enter the national 
                                                 
1
 Some scholars argue 30 percent women MPs is considered to be the critical mass needed for women to be able 
to have substantial influence over the policy process (McAllister and Studlar 2002, Wängnerud 2009). More 
about the critical mass is described below. 
2
 Pleas see Appendix Table 8.1 for an overview of which these countries are, and how common gender quotas 
are amongst them. 
8 
28 
2001 2011
Number of countries with more than 
30 percent women MPs 
Number of countries with more than 30 percent women MPs
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parliament despite institutional, structural, and cultural barriers that traditionally prevents 
women for entering the parliament. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The incremental vs. the fast track to women’s representation 
For a long time the proportion of women in national parliament was considered to be an 
indicator of the status of countries’ gender equality, and the outcome of society’s overall 
development. This is most evident in the Scandinavian countries where women experienced a 
step-wise inclusion in society’s economic and political activities (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 
2005). Women’s participation in workforce was enabled by welfare solutions, and increased 
inclusion in workforce led to increased political awareness and political interest among the 
Scandinavian women. The strengthened position in society experienced by the Scandinavian 
women was followed by a step-wise increase of the number of women in the national 
parliaments.  
 
The Scandinavian example inspired Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) to construct the ideal 
type called the incremental track to women’s representation. According to the incremental 
ideal type women’s representation is explained by institutional factors, such as the electoral 
system and regime type, structural factors, such as women’s workforce participation and 
economic development, and cultural factors, such as religion (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 
2005:27, Wängnerud 2009). Depending on the characteristics of the institutional, structural, 
and cultural factors, women’s political representation is enabled or prevented. High levels of 
women’s representation is a time-consuming process in which the development of women’s 
overall rights and status alongside with women’s representation in the national parliament. 
Hence, according to the incremental ideal type women’s representation is a measure of 
women’s overall status and the country’s gender equality status (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 
2005:27). 
 
During the last decade, however, the validity of the conventional wisdom of women’s 
representation has been questioned. Critical voices argue that the conventional wisdom is 
based on the wisdom of women’s representation in western democracies, thus irrelevant for 
explaining the proportion of women MPs in developing countries. Some of the countries with 
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the highest levels of women’s representation today, are non-democratic regimes where 
women’s status is low and gender-inequalities are more relevant label than equalities.  
Scholars argue that gender quotas help women overcome the traditional institutional, 
structural and cultural barriers to become elected, therefore women’s representation is not a 
measure of gender equality or women’s status nowadays (Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et 
al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, Delvine and Elgie 2008, Dahlerup 2006, Jones 2004, Htun 
2004, etc.).   
 
Inspired by that last two decades’ development, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) constructed 
the second ideal type to women’s representation, the fast track. According to the fast track, 
gender quotas can contribute to leaps in women’s representation without being succeeded by 
societal inclusion of women. Closest to the fast track ideal type are the countries in Latin 
America. (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:32). 
 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) suggest the two ideal types explaining women’s 
representation are useful tools for the understanding of women’s representation today. 
2.2 Why women in parliament? 
Several arguments motivate women’s presence in national parliaments. Except for the 
argument of justice; women constitutes half of the world’s population and should therefore be 
present, the literature suggests a large number of other normative, theoretical and empirical 
arguments. The baseline argument is, however, that gender constructs a dividing line in 
political contexts. 
2.2.1 Politics of presence and women’s interests 
When Anne Phillips launched her theory of “Politics of Presence” in 1995, a new chapter in 
the literature on women’s representation was started. Until then, the representation on ideas 
had been in focus in the literature on political representation.  
 
“There are particular needs, interests, and concerns that arise from women’s experiences, and 
these will be inadequately addressed in a politics that is dominated by men.”  
Anne Phillips (1995:66) 
 
Explaining the Politics of Presence, Phillips underlines that the political process can never 
fully be planned in advance, therefore the parliamentarians’ personal experience will always 
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affect their political work to a smaller or larger degree. Hence, if a social category such as 
gender is under-represented, women’s personal experience will be as well. Therefore, the 
legislative process will not include women’s experiences. Women’s representation is thence 
important for a gender-balanced representation of personal experiences. According to the 
feminist literature, women have certain interests based on their common experiences as 
women, formulated by the so called women’s interests.  
 
Phillips’ theory is based on discourse of women’s interests (Halsaa 1987, Hernes 1987, 
Jonasdottir 1985). These interests are not genetically associated to women, but rather the 
outcome of shared experiences of, for instances, care responsibilities, both in the public and 
the private sphere
3
, and gender-related discrimination. Due to the fact that most women share 
the experiences contributing to the interests of women, the political work of most women MPs 
will be affected by women’s interests4. Furthermore, it is believed to be in the interest of 
women MPs to contribute to the creation of policies which strengthen women’s autonomy 
(Wängnerud 2000:70)
5
. Therefore Phillips’ theory and women’s interests are important for 
understanding why women and men MPs are considered to be different from each other.  
2.2.3 Women’s representation and democracy 
Nowadays, women’s representation is considered to be an integrated part of liberal 
democracy. In general the proportion of women MPs is considered an indicator of gender 
equality and an important factor in the democratization process. (Dahlerup 2006:306, 
Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002:322). However, the debate surrounding women’s 
representation and democracy reveals somewhat diverse arguments within the different 
regime types
6
. In semi- or non-democratic regimes is women’s representation generally 
motivated by being a part of democratization process. Therefore, increased levels of women’s 
representation are considered to strengthen democracy. The arguments are more in general 
terms than those found in the consolidated democracies (Tripp et al 2006:123). 
                                                 
3
 The private sphere is at home and at the public sphere includes the labour market. 
4 According to Wängnerud (2009:53) studies of women’s descriptive representation, such as this one, do not 
need more far-reaching definitions on women’s interests. Therefore I will not discuss the concept of women’s 
representation further into detail. More precise definition of women’s representation is more important for 
studies of women’s substantive representation. The concepts of descriptive and substantive representation will be 
discussed below.
 
5
 One could also include the discourse of empowerment in this context. However, this thesis will not involve the 
empowerment discourse further into detail. 
6
 This thesis includes three different regime types; democratic regimes, semi-democratic regimes and non-
democratic regimes. The categorisation is based on Freedom House’s Democracy Index. Further details could be 
found in the Data section. 
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In the democratic regimes, on the other hand, women’s representation is perceived being an 
Achilles heel in the democratic systems. How could a country be labelled democratic, if 
women are heavily under-represented? The debate includes more specific arguments of justice 
and women’s interests, rather than the general perception of women’s representation as an 
indication of democratic status (Dahlerup 2006:207). However, women’s representation in 
democratic regimes is still considered to strengthen democracy, even if the arguments are 
different form those found in other regime types. 
2.3 Factors explaining women’s representation  
Three types of factors explaining cross-country differences in women’s representation, is 
found in the literature: institutional, structural and cultural factors. This thesis primarily focus 
on the institutional factor gender quotas, however in order to control the strength of the 
impact of gender quotas, other institutional as well as structural and cultural factors are 
important to be aware of. Because of the only indirect importance for the purpose of this 
thesis, structural and cultural factors will be shortly introduced, before turning all of the 
attention towards the institutional factors.  
Figure 2.2 Factors explaining cross-country differences in women’s representation  
 
Institutional 
Factors 
• Electoral System 
• Regime Type 
• Gender Quotas 
Structural 
Factors 
• HDI 
Cultural 
Factors 
• Religion 
Women's 
descriptive 
representation 
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2.3.1 The impact of structural factors on women’s representation 
During the 1960s and 1970s, economic development in general, and economic growth in 
particular, was considered to be the panacea to women’s involvement in politics (Inglehart 
and Norris 2003:4). Economic growth would foster societal development which in turn would 
automatically contribute to the empowerment of women (Inglehart and Norris 2003).  
 
Considering the Scandinavian countries were at top of the world ranking over women’s 
representation, it is easy to understand why a country’s economic development was believed 
to be the most important factor for the number of women MPs: In the Scandinavian countries 
women’s inclusion in the national economy had been followed by a slow but steady increase 
of women in the national parliaments. However, as scholars continued to study women’s 
representation, the importance of economic development appeared limited. (Ingehart and 
Norris 2003:5).  
 
Today, the women’s participation in the workforce and women’s level of education are 
considered to be the most important structural factors having impact on women’s 
representation (Stockmer and Byrne 2011).  
2.3.2 The impact of cultural factors on women’s representation 
Several studies have found a correlation between culture and the number of women in 
national parliaments. The dominating culture is believed to have impact on the social norms 
and the population’s attitudes towards women’s role in society. In patriarchal societies, 
women usually face difficulties reaching the political sphere and become a part of the elected 
body. Religion is believed to be correlated to women’s representation (Inglehart and Norris 
2003:50). Inglehart and Norris’ findings shows that Islam as is negatively correlated with 
gender equality (2003:68).  
 
2.4 Women’s political representation  
Hanna Pitkin illuminates the importance of understanding four dimensions of political 
representation, in the book “The concept of Representation” (1967). Each of the dimensions 
contributes with a perspective explaining which ways women can be politically represented. 
Pitkin’s four dimensions of representation include; formal, descriptive, substantive, and 
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symbolic representation. Women’s political representation in this thesis involves the 
representation in national parliaments.  
 
On next page, scholars’ interpretation of Hanna Pitkin’s four dimensions of representation 
will be presented. The aim is to provide the reader with information on how, and why the 
dimensions are useful tools for the understanding of women’s representation in this thesis. 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the impact of gender quotas on women’s 
descriptive representation, the primary focus involves the two dimensions of women’s formal 
and descriptive representation. However, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) it is useful to 
have knowledge about the all four dimensions of representation in analysis on women’s 
representation, hence even substantive and symbolic representation will be introduced. 
2.4.1 Formal representation – rules of the game 
The formal dimension of representation, involves the institutional rules and procedures 
necessary to select the political representatives. These rules and procedures include for 
instance the electoral system and use of gender quotas. The formal representation contributes 
to an understanding of which the institutional barriers are preventing women from being 
elected. It also describes what mechanisms contribute to high levels of women’s 
representation. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:408).  
2.4.2 Descriptive representation – does the parliament mirror the population?
 
 
Descriptive representation is defined as “extent the representatives ‘stand for’ the 
represented” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:408). The idea behind descriptive 
representation is that the representatives should mirror the population in important aspects 
such as gender, age, social background, education, and occupation. Descriptive representation 
is also called numerical representation referring to the number of women MPs (Schwindt-
Bayer and Mishler 2005:409). In this thesis, the descriptive dimension of representation 
includes the proportion of women representatives in the national parliament’s single or lower 
chamber
7
. 
                                                 
7
 The descriptive representation could also refer to other factors such as the level of education among women 
MPs (see for instance Murray 2012). The norm in studies of women’s descriptive representation similar to this 
one, is to measure the proportion of women in the single or lower chamber of the national parliament (IPU 2012, 
Wängnreud 2009). 
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2.4.3 Substantive and symbolic representation  
As already mentioned, this thesis will not analyse the substantive and the symbolic 
dimensions of representation since these dimensions are not included by the purpose of this 
thesis. However, it might be relevant for the interpretation of the results to be familiar with 
the last two dimensions, thus they will be introduced.   
 
Substantive representation could be understood as policy responsiveness: women MPs are 
expected to prioritize other policy areas, such as health and child care issues, and behave 
different compared to men MPs. This is explained by the so called women’s interests, which 
were introduced above. Hence, the proportion of women in national parliament is expected to 
have an impact on the policy outcome. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:409). Pitkin’s 
definition of substantive representation states: 
 
“Representation here means acting in the interest of the represented,  
in a manner responsive to them”  
Hanna Pitkin (1967:209) 
 
The symbolic representation includes how the voters perceive the representatives and the 
work the representatives perform. The symbolic dimension could be measures as the 
populations’ perceptions on whether the parliament is considered legitimate or not. 
(Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:409). 
2.4 Linking the dimensions of women’s representation 
According to Pitkin the dimensions of representation are parts of a coherent whole, hence the 
dimensions need to be analysed in relation to each other (1967:10-11). These relations could 
be described as links. The purpose of this thesis is to explain what impact gender quotas have 
on the proportion of women MPs, thus the link between the formal and the descriptive 
dimensions of representation: 
2.4.1 Linking formal and descriptive representation 
2.4.1.1 Electoral System and women’s descriptive representation 
Women’s formal representation, i.e. the institutional factors, is expected to have impact on 
women’s descriptive representation, the proportion of MPs who are women.  
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The country’s electoral system is a determinant of how the citizens’ votes will transformed 
into seats in the parliament. Depending on the electoral system’s type and characteristics, the 
parliament is less or more likely to have high levels of women’s descriptive representation. In 
other words: the level of women’s representation generally varies between the electoral 
systems (Paxton et al 2010, Wängnerud 2009). The electoral system is furthermore, 
considered one of the most powerful predictors of a country’s proportion of women MPs 
(Paxton et al 2010:43, Matland and Taylor 1997:187).  
 
But which types of electoral systems is interesting for the level of women MPs? According to 
the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral system design the electoral systems are 
generally categorized into three families; proportional representation systems (PR), 
plurality/majority systems, and mixed electoral systems
8
 (Reynolds et al 2005:3).  
 
PR-systems are in general favourable to women’s descriptive representation compared to 
majority systems
9
. Due to the electoral districts’ multi-member characteristics in PR-systems, 
the political parties are able to use the candidate lists as a measure to promote the election of 
women candidates. A gender-balanced candidate list give the voters the opportunity to base 
their choice on other policy concern than gender, but still be able to elect women MPs. 
(Reynolds et al 2005:61).  
 
Furthermore, PR-systems translate the share of votes a party get into corresponding 
proportion of seats in parliament. Hence, if the political parties have gender-balanced 
candidate lists it is likely that the parliament will be gender-balanced as well (Reynolds et al 
2005:57). In most PR systems the candidate lists are ‘closed’ meaning the voters cannot 
change the ranking of candidates. Thus, if women are placed at electable positions at the 
candidate lists by the political parties, it is favourable to women’s descriptive representation 
(Reynolds et al 2005:61).  
 
As a contrast to PR-systems, majority systems have single-member districts which encourage 
the political parties to favour candidates who appeal as many voters as possible. Women 
                                                 
8
 Categorization of electoral system: PR: List Proportional Representation (List PR) and the Single Transferable 
Vote (STV), Majority (including plurality): First Past The Post (FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Party Block Vote 
(PBV), Alternative Vote (AV), and the Two-Round System (TRS).  Mixed: Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
and Parallel systems (Reynolds et al 2005:3). 
9
 Mixed systems are expected to have an impact somewhere in between PR and majority systems. 
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candidates might therefore have difficulties to compete in the race of becoming the parties’ 
candidate. Because the political parties in general chose candidates who beforehand is known 
to be accepted by the majority of voters, women’s descriptive representation is affected 
negatively. Generally, the most accepted candidates are politicians with previous experience, 
hence, in systems where women are under-represented men have more experience and might 
therefore be preferred candidates. (Reynolds et al 2005:61).  
 
According to research mixed electoral systems seem to be an alternative somewhere in 
between the PR and the majority systems, thereby the expected impact on women’s 
representation is somewhere in between as well.  
To sum up the section on electoral systems and women’s descriptive representation, two 
things stand out: PR-systems contribute to the election of women meanwhile majority systems 
act as a barrier preventing women from being elected. 
 
2.4.1.2 Regime type and women’s descriptive representation 
In studies of women’s representation it is common to use regime type, i.e. the level of 
democracy, as a control variable (Dahlerup 2006, Tripp et al 2006, Ingelhart/Norris/Welzel 
2003). According to Paxton (1997:445) democratic regimes are believed to improve women’s 
representation through the open competition and free and fair elections.  
 
It is argued, however, that women’s representation is not favoured by democracy if cultural, 
economic and social inequalities are not removed (Yoon 2001:173). Furthermore, Howell 
(2006) argues that even non-democratic regimes may be able to have high levels of women’s 
descriptive representation due to the lack of competition and absence of free and fair 
elections. The characteristics of the non-democratic regime type leave a room of manoeuvre 
for autocratic leaders to place women in the national parliament despite lack of support 
among the population. In non-democratic regimes it is possible for the political leaders to 
adopt legislations favouring women’s representation and implement these legislations 
efficiently. (Howell 2006). Hence, it may not be the democratic regime type as such that 
contribute to high level of women MPs, something confirmed by empirical findings. 
 
Empirical cross-sectional studies on women’s representation and regime type show mixed 
findings. The level of democracy generally does not show any effect on women’s 
representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999:239, Paxton and Kunovich 2003:113, Reynolds 
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1999:569). Level of democracy has also shown negative effect in other studies (Paxton 1997, 
Yoon 2001). According to Paxton et al 2010 no larger cross-national studies has shown 
positive effect from democracy and women’s descriptive representation (Paxton et al 
2010:29). Paxton explains the lack of impact of democracy that the effect needs to be 
analysed over time (Paxton et al 2010:43). Paxton et al longitudinal analysis shows that 
women’s representation takes longer time to accumulate in democratic regimes than in semi-
democratic or non-democratic regimes where women’s representation is hypothesised to 
change more easily (Paxton et al 2010:29).  
 
The tendency in studies of the impact of regime type and women’s descriptive representation 
is to focus on democratic regimes. Somewhat surprisingly considering the last two decades’ 
development of women’s representation in non-democratic regimes, there seem to be a 
relative lack of studies paying particular attention to women’s representation in non-
democratic regimes. (See Paxton et al 2010, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Yoon 2001, 
Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Reynolds 1999). 
 
2.4.1.3 Gender quotas and women’s descriptive representation  
The final important characteristic of the formal dimension of representation and the link to 
women’s descriptive representation is also the characteristics of primary importance in this 
thesis; gender quotas. The introduction of gender quotas has gained salience within the 
research on women’s representation during the last decades. Leaps in women’s descriptive 
representation have occurred in many countries after the adoption of gender quotas. Since 
gender quotas constitute part of this thesis’ purpose, gender quotas will be described further in 
detail below. Useful to know at this point is that gender quotas are institutional arrangements 
which help women to enter the national parliament. 
2.4.2 Linking descriptive and substantive representation 
As mentioned above, it might be useful for the interpretation of the results from the analysis, 
to have some understanding of links between dimensions other than the formal and 
descriptive. This section will introduce the reader to part of the research on the link between 
women’s descriptive and substantive representation.  
 
A growing field of research focuses on the link between descriptive representation and 
substantive representation, i.e. are women able to affect the policy outcome once elected? 
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This link is formulated by the politics of presence. As mentioned above, the politics of 
presence is based on the idea that men and women MPs are different form each other. Several 
empirical studies support the correlation between higher level of women’s representation in 
parliament and changes in terms of policy outcome (Childs and Krook 2008, Wängnerud 
2000 & 2005, Bratton 2005, Lovenduski and Norris 2004, Sung 2003, Studlar and McAllister 
2002, Dollar et al 2001).  
The link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation is also studied by the 
research on women’s representation and the Quality and Government10 (henceforth QoG). 
Increased levels of women MPs are argued to lead to lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al 
2001). Although Sung (2003:718), questions the results found by Dollar et al by arguing that 
the correlation between women’s representation and low levels of corruption are both the 
outcome of liberal democracy. Charron and Lapuente
11
 (2010) contrast Sung’s statement by 
showing empirical findings for a correlation between certain types of non-democratic regimes 
and low levels of corruption. Relevant for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that even non-
democratic regimes seem to be able to have features traditionally associated with democratic 
regimes.  
 
The section on the link between descriptive and substantive representation ends by 
introducing the discourse about the critical mass. The critical mass theory argues that it is not 
until the number of women MPs has reached a certain critical mass of the total members of 
parliament, that women are believed to exert influence over the policy process. The critical 
mass is generally argued to be reach once the parliament has 30 percent women MPs. (Studlar 
and McAllister 2002:235, Wängnerud 2009:60)  
2.4.3 An integrated model of representation 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005:410) suggest an integrated model of women’s 
representation, by arguing that all four dimensions are likely to be correlated. On the next 
page, the authors of this thesis has applied gender quotas on the integrated model, by relating 
                                                 
10
 The Quality of Government is “research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the 
Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government 
institutions.” (QoG 2012) 
11
 Charron and Lapuente use the definition “authoritarian regimes” in their paper. I chose to write non-
democratic regimes in order not to confuse the reader since I will continue to use the definition non-democratic 
regimes in this thesis. Because both Charron/Lapuente and I refer to the same of countries, there should not be 
any problem with replacing their definition with non-democratic regimes.  
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Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s arguments motivating the integrated model to the theory of 
gender quotas. 
 
Figure 2.2 Gender quotas applied on Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s integrated model 
 
 
The adoption changes the character of the formal dimension. Gender quotas are believed to 
have impact on women’s descriptive representation, i.e. the proportion of women MPs, 
according to previous research (Dahlerup 2006).  
 
Quotas are also believed to impact the symbolic representation in the sense that adoption of 
quotas might awake feelings among the citizens and draw public attention towards the issue 
of gender equality. The adoption of quotas may have impact on the populations’ perceptions 
on gender-related issues. (Bacci 2006). 
 
Referring to the politics of presence, the increased level of women’s descriptive 
representation is expected to have an impact on women’s substantive representation. In other 
words: the increased numbers of women MPs will have an impact on the policy outcome, due 
to women’s interests. (Bacci 2006, Wängnerud 2000 and 2005, Dollar et al 2001). 
 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler’s (2005) integrated model predicts the increased priority of 
women’s interests the parliament to have an impact on the symbolic representation: By 
affecting the populations’ perceptions of the policy outcome and the overall perceived 
legitimacy of the parliament’s performance. According to Dollar et al (2001:424) women MPs 
are less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal gains; thereby the increased number 
of women will strengthen the legitimacy of the parliament. 
Formal 
representation 
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Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) would then argue the strengthened legitimacy could 
contribute to the adoption of new for instance quota regulation, i.e. have an impact on 
women’s formal representation. The conclusion to be drawn from the introduction of the 
integrated model is that, even if it is not directly relevant for the purpose of this thesis, the 
adoption of gender quotas could have more impact than controlled for in this thesis. 
 
2.5 Gender Quotas 
The centre of interest in this thesis is the impact of gender quotas on women’s descriptive 
representation. Following section aims at introducing gender quotas and former research on 
the impact from quotas on women’s descriptive representation. 
2.5.1 Introducing gender quotas  
As mentioned above, gender quotas are institutional mechanisms that countries can use to 
increase the number of women MPs. Gender quotas are not a one-single phenomenon, but 
rather there are a several types of quotas. In cross-country analysis on the impact of quotas it 
could be important to separate the different quota types due to research expect the types to 
have different impact on women’s descriptive representation. This thesis will divide quotas 
into three types; reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas 
(Krook 2009, Quotaproject 2012).  
 
The different quota types and the impact on women’s representation are topics discussed 
further below. First the definition of gender quotas, used in this thesis will be presented: 
 
“Electoral gender quotas may be defined as legal or voluntary regulations that for public 
elections require a certain number or percent of women or of both sexes on one of the three 
levels” 12 Drude Dahlerup (2007:79) 
 
Nowadays, gender quotas are considered to be the most powerful predictor of a country’s 
level of women’s representation, and a discourse that have gained increased interest within 
the literature on women’s representation during the last 15 years (Tripp and Kang 2008:338, 
                                                 
12 
This thesis will not focus on all three levels but just two of the levels. According to Dahlerup (2006:19-21) 
gender quotas can target the aspirant level (the nomination process), the candidate level (the political parties’ 
candidate lists), or the parliament (the distribution of seats in the parliament). This thesis will only pay attention 
to the candidate and the parliament level, since these are the two important in cross-country studies.
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Krook 2009). Empirical analyses have shown that quotas have helped women overcome 
institutional, structural, and cultural barriers preventing women’s political representation 
(Krook 2009, Jones 2004, Htun 2004).  
 
Massive pressure from women’s movements together with the attention towards women’s 
under-representation from international organisations, have contributed to a globally spread of 
quota adoption. As a result, 106 countries have some type of gender quotas today. 
(Quotaproject 2012, Dahlerup 2007:73). Usually gender quotas are considered a temporarily 
measure to increase the number of women MPs (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011:187). 
 
Gender quotas are found in all types of countries considering regime type, electoral systems, 
level of human development, religions, etc. Hence, the internal variation is large within the 
group of countries having gender quotas (Dahlerup 2008:322). 
2.5.2 Beijing 1995 and the changed international norm 
At the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 199513 the issue global under-
representation of women in national parliament was discussed (UN 1995). Women’s 
representation gained salience during the beginning of the 1990s, much due to women’s 
movements which managed to bring the issue to the global political agenda (Dahlerup 
2006:5). In Beijing 1995, the participants agreed to encourage the adoption of gender quotas 
in order to increase the number of women in national parliaments (Dahlerup 2006:4).  Beijing 
1995, marks a shift in the international norm about how gender quotas are framed: from being 
a highly controversial institutional mechanism before 1995, to have become an accepted tool 
to increase women’s representation nowadays. 
2.5.3 Critique on quotas 
Even if gender quotas are widely accepted nowadays, there are still controversies related to 
the quotas. Depending the interpretation of the concept of equality, gender quotas could be 
described to either discriminate men, or help women by removing institutional, structural, and 
cultural barriers which prevents women from being elected (Bacci 2006:33, Dahlerup 
2007:33-34). Equality can be understood as either equal opportunities or equal results. Before 
the Beijing Conference in 1995, equal opportunities was the most common interpretation. 
                                                 
13
 Henceforth referred to as “Beijing 1995”. The participating countries, international organisations and NGOs 
agreements were summarized in the document “Platform for Action”.  
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However, as a consequence from the global change in attitude towards gender quotas, today, 
equal results is the more common interpretation.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Arguments for and against quotas 
Quotas Proponents Quota Opponents 
 Equal Results  Equal Opportunity 
 Conventional merit 
underestimated 
women's experiences 
 Conventional merits 
are the only true 
merits 
 Gender is a merit  Gender is not a merit 
 Quotas compensate 
for institutional, 
structural, and cultural 
barriers 
 Quotas discriminates 
men 
 
 
 Goal: gender equality  Goal: gender equality 
Source: Murray 2012, Francheschet and Piscopo 2012, and O’Brien 2012, Bacci 2006, Htun and Jones 2002 
 
The traditional way of understanding equality, which is generally found among quota 
opponents, is that everyone should have the same opportunity to be politically represented. 
Therefore, quota opponents argue, gender quotas discriminate men since not all people are 
treated the same (Bacci 2006:33). The goal for quota opponents is a gender blind polity where 
the most important factor in the political recruitment process is merits
14
. A competitive 
process where merits are in centre of attention should lead to recruitment of the best qualified 
political representatives. Quota opponents argue the recruitment of parliamentarians should 
deal with merits and not gender of the candidates, since the opponent do not consider gender a 
merit (Bacci 2006:34, Htun and Jones 2002:35). Quota opponents are not against gender 
equality, but against quotas since quotas discriminate men (Bacci 2006:34). Furthermore, 
gender quotas contribute to decreased competence among the parliamentarians, since quotas 
replace qualified men MPs with less qualified women MPs (Francheschet et al 2012). 
 
The traditional interpretation of equality stands in contrast with the feminist perspective. 
According to feminist theory equality of results is considered most fair and gender quotas the 
tool to reach equal results. Quotas defenders argue there is no such thing as equal opportunity 
for men and women to become elected. Women’s political representation is prevented by 
institutional, structural, and cultural barriers; hence only in a world where those barriers do 
not exist will men and women have the same opportunities. Quotas compensate women for 
                                                 
14
 The interpretation of merit is described on next page. 
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the barriers and enable equal results. Furthermore, quota proponents consider gender to be a 
relevant merit for political representation. Hence, the traditional way of defining merits are 
not sufficient enough to include women’s merits. (Bacci 2006:34).  
2.6 Types of gender quotas 
The many definitions of quota types could be described as a quotas ‘jungle’ (Delvine and 
Elgie 2008, Dahlerup 2006, Htun 2004, Jones 2004). However, Drude Dahlerup suggests a 
categorisation of quotas that enable cross-country studies on the impact of quotas. Dahlerup’s 
three types include: reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas:  
 
Table 2.2 Gender Quota Types  
Reserved seats 
 
Reserves a certain number of seats in the 
parliament exclusively for women. 
 
Legislated candidate quotas 
 
The political parties are obliged by the law or 
constitution to have a certain minimum of women 
candidates at their party lists. 
Voluntary party quotas 
 
Rules or targets voluntarily set by political parties, 
that require a minimum number of women 
candidates at the party lists.   
Source: Dahlerup 2006:21, Quotaproject 2012 
2.6.1 Reserved seats 
The reserved seats quota type is primarily found in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, 
generally in semi-democratic or non-democratic regimes (Krook 2009:6, Tripp and Kang 
2008:358). Characteristic for countries that have adopted reserved seats is, furthermore, that 
the countries traditionally have very low levels of women’s representation (Krook 2009:6).  
 
There are different versions of this quota type; the quota provision could either guarantee a 
certain number of women in the national parliament by creating separate candidate districts 
for women, or create separate electoral rolls particularly for women. A third way is to 
distribute the parliamentary seats among women based the political parties’ proportions of 
votes. (Krook 2009:6). The most important feature of reserved seats, and the common 
denominator for all versions, is that certain number of seats in the national parliament is 
reserved exclusively for women (Krook 2009:7). Therefore, this thesis will include all 
versions of reserved seats into one type. 
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What separates reserved seats from the two other quota types, is that it involve the 
parliamentary level of the electoral process. Reserves seats are the least common quota type 
among the countries; 18 countries
15
 have it at the moment (Quotaproject 2012). The reserved 
seats quota gained popularity after Bejing 1995, and is generally considered to have most 
impact on women’s descriptive representation contributing to leaps in women’s representation 
in for instance Rwanda and Mozambique. (Krook 2009, Dahlerup 2006, Htun 2004). 
2.6.2 Legislated candidate quotas 
Legislated party quotas are national regulation demanding all political parties to ensure a 
certain number of women at the electoral candidate lists. The legislated candidate quotas 
could either establish a minimum proportion of women on the party lists, or both demand a 
minimum proportion of women candidates and mandate the placement of the women 
candidates (Jones 2004:1204).  If the legislation require both a minimum of women, and 
mandates the placements the impact from legislated candidate quotas on women’s descriptive 
representation is expected to be largest.  
 
There are several cases where legislated candidate quotas have had significant effect on 
women’s descriptive representation, for instance in Argentina (Francheschet and Piscopo 
2012:45), in Costa Rica (Jones 2004:1203), and in France (Murray 2012:27). Today there are 
40 countries
16
 having legislated quotas 
2.6.3 Voluntary party quotas 
Voluntary party quotas are voluntary quotas adopted by one or several political parties in the 
country. The political parties that have adopted voluntary quotas have written into their 
internal regulation that they must take positive action in order to present gender-balanced 
candidate list. (Matland 2006:282, Dahlerup 2007:78 and 2006:20).  
 
Voluntary party quota is the most common type of gender quota, at the moment found in 50 
countries
17
. In some countries political parties have chosen to adopt voluntary quotas beyond 
the legislated candidate or reserved seats quotas. In those cases the political parties consider 
                                                 
15
 Today 18 countries have reserved seats, please see appendix for list of countries (Quotaproject 2012).  
16
At the moment 40 countries have legislated candidate quotas, please see appendix for list of countries 
(Quotaproject 2012).  
17
 At the moment 50 countries have voluntary party quotas, please see appendix for list of countries 
(Quotaproject 2012).  
 23 
the national quota to be set too low and therefore voluntarily adopt an additional quota. 
Hence, it is possible for countries to have both reserved seats/legislated candidate quotas and 
voluntary party quotas.
18
  
 
The adoption of voluntary party quotas is generally considered to primarily have a symbolic 
value in terms of the political parties signals women’s representation and gender equality are 
prioritizes issued within the party
 19
 (Matland 2006). The expected impact on women’s 
descriptive representation is therefore limited. 
2.7 Do quotas always work? 
Since the mid-1990s when the number of countries adopting electoral gender quotas set off, 
the world has experienced some historical leaps in women’s representation at country-level 
(Tripp et al 2006:112). Several studies find that the adoption of gender quotas has had impact 
on women’s descriptive representation (Murray 2012, Francheschet and Piscopo 2012, 
O’Brien 2012, Araujo and Garcia 2006:100). However, there are also countries where gender 
quotas have not had the expected strong positive impact on women’s descriptive 
representation (Krook 2009:6, Araujo and Garcia 2006:99-100, Nanivadekar, 2006:119, 
Freidenvall 2006:78, Jones 2004:1203). In other words: gender quotas do not automatically 
lead to dramatic increased number of women MPs (Dahlerup 2006:10, Matland 2006:278). 
One reason for lack of impact could the that gender quotas are believed to have a time-
delayed impact on women’s representation (Araujo and Garcia 2006:100).  
2.8 Gender Quotas and Democracy 
Gender quotas have been implemented by all types of regimes (Dahlerup 2007:77): 
consolidated democracies such as France, Norway, and Sweden, as well as non-democratic 
countries such as Rwanda, Djibouti, and China are all countries with gender quotas. 
According to Paxton et al (1997:445) gender quotas are believed to have impact in all regime 
types. 
  
                                                 
18
 However, according to the data used in this thesis it is only 15 out of 106 countries having both types therefore 
it should not have an impact on the results from the regression analysis. 
19
 Some scholars divide voluntary party quotas into two types depending on which level in the nomination 
process the quota provision targets; aspirant and candidate level (Matland 2006:280-281). This thesis will not 
make such a separation but will include both types in the voluntary quotas category. Due to methodological 
reasons it would be complicated and time-consuming to collect such data, but first and foremost there are no 
strong theoretical arguments why the types would be of importance to the results in terms of quantitative 
analysis.  
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However, there are diverse opinion among scholars concerning whether or not regime type is 
a relevant factor to consider in comparative studies of the impact of gender quotas on 
women’s descriptive representation. Jones (2004) for instance includes only democratic 
regimes in his study, assumable because he does not find it relevant to include other regime 
types. On the topic of whether or not include regime type as a control variable, Tripp and 
Kang (2008) make following conclusion from their analysis of the impact of gender quotas on 
women’s descriptive representation year 2006 in 153 countries: 
 
“Our study suggests that there is no strong link between level of democracy and women’s 
representation. We believe that the use of quotas increases rates of female representation in 
many non-democratic regimes, making regime type unimportant for explaining the numbers 
of women in parliament” 
 Aili Maria Tripp and Alice Kang 2008:355 
 
Considering causality, one might argue the opposite of Tripp and Kang’s conclusion: since 
many non-democracies have adopted gender quotas, which have had impact on women’s 
descriptive representation, regime type is an important variable to include when explaining 
the numbers of women in national parliaments.  
 
Besides, Paxton et al (2010) analyse the impact of democracy, electoral system and gender 
quotas on women’s representation in 110 countries from 1975 to 2000. Paxton et al’s findings 
show that both gender quotas and democracy have significant effects on the level of women’s 
representation over time (Paxton et al 2010:25). In their conclusions, Paxton et al (2010:43) 
suggest that democracy benefits women’s descriptive representation in the long run.  
 
Relevant in the discourse of gender quotas is which role democracy had in the countries’ 
adoption processes. As revealed above, the quotas were motivated in democracies as a 
mechanism useful to strengthen the democratic legitimacy. In democracies the adoption of 
gender quotas has been promoted by arguments of justice and the representation on women’s 
interests (Dahlerup 2006:306). The normative debate in democracies thus included women’s 
under-representation in national parliaments as constrain for democratic legitimacy.  
 
In semi- and non-democratic regimes however, the adoption of gender quotas are in general 
considered a tool contributing to the democratic process. Many countries adopt gender quotas 
in hopes to send signals to the international community that gender equality is a prioritized 
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issue in their country. As described above women’s representation is traditionally correlated 
with a country’s level of development explained by the incremental track to women’s 
representation. (Tripp et al 2006:123, Dahlerup 2006, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).  
 
Furthermore, even if the national parliament do not have any substantial power, such as the 
case in non-democratic regimes, gender quotas could be important for women’s 
representation: the increased number of women MPs in non-democracies may in fact prepare 
women for future political work. Hence, even if women do not have any substantial 
representation in non-democratic regimes women’s presence might be important for the future 
to come. The effects of quotas might have an important symbolic value for gender equality in 
all regime types. The presence of women in the national parliament indicates women’s 
political participation as legitimate and may send signals to the population that women have a 
legitimate role in all parts of society. (Nanivadekar, 2006:119).  
 
Important to consider, not at least in the context of non-democratic regimes, is also that one of 
the argument to increase the number of women in the legislative body is to improve the 
quality of governance (Dahlerup 2006:306). As mentioned in the section on why women 
should be present in the national parliament, findings indicate a correlation between higher 
levels of women’s representation and lower levels of corruption at country-level (Dollar et al 
2001). Hence, the increased number of women in national parliament could be important for 
the quality of government in the long run. 
 
As mentioned above, actors within international community
20
 have encouraged countries with 
low levels of women’s representation to adopt gender quotas. Developing countries might 
accept adoption of gender quotas as a response to the conditions correlated with adjustment 
programs
21
 (Abou-Zeid 2006:173). Structural adjustment programs are considered to be one 
explanation why non-democracies adopt gender quotas. It is not clear however, whether 
quotas have the same impact in non-democratic regimes as in democratic regimes. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 These actors include for instance the UN, the ASEAN, the African Union, the European Union, etc (Tripp 
2003:6) 
21
 Structural adjustment programs are policies implemented in developing countries by International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Developing countries get loans on conditioned terms thus have to adopt a 
certain policy such as gender quotas. 
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Could the adoption of gender quotas be one small step towards democratization in non-
democratic regimes? This is outside of the purpose of this thesis, but is interesting to consider 
for the interpretations of the results in the analysis. In other words, it remains to see which the 
impact of gender quotas might be if non-democratic countries with high levels of women’s 
representation all of a sudden takes a turn towards democratization. This is not a completely 
unrealistic approach considering the heavy pressure for democratization from the international 
community in countries such as Afghanistan and Rwanda. (Matland 2006:278). However, 
before considering the potential outcome of women’s representation in non-democratic 
parliaments, there is a need to analyse the impact of gender quotas. 
2.9 What to expect. 
The world of women’s representation has changed after the global spread of gender quotas. 
The conventional wisdom of the level of women in national parliaments as an outcome from 
an incremental process is nowadays questioned. Instead scholars suggests a fast track to 
women’s representation have developed where the use of gender quotas contribute to leaps in 
the number of women MPs, the world have never before seen. The last decade, there has been 
some remarkable increase in women’s representation in non-democratic regimes after the 
introduction of quotas. At the same time, there is a relative lack of empirical studies using 
global, cross-country design and large-n sample. Little attention is directed towards the 
impact in non-democratic regimes. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the last decade’s 
development of women’s descriptive representation in national parliaments worldwide. The 
aim is to study the impact of gender quotas on the changed levels of women MPs. 
2.9 Research questions 
1. Which types of countries have gender quotas? 
2. Have gender quotas changed levels of women’s representation descriptive 
representation from 2001 to 2011? 
3. Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type?  
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
What is needed in order to answer the research questions above? This section aims at 
describing the methodology used in the analysis, as well as various pros and cons with the 
approach used. 
3.1 Data and operationalizations 
The data used in this thesis is both of quantitative and qualitative (categorical) character, since 
both types of data are necessary to answer the research questions. In order to conduct 
regression analysis including variables at the ordinal level of scale some variables have been 
categorised into so called dummy variables (Sirkin 2006:35). Below the variables will be 
described into detail including discussion on operationalizations, validity
22
, etc. 
3.1.1 Data sources
23
 
The primary source of data has been the QoG cross-section dataset. However, a number of 
variables included in this thesis have been collected from other databases in order to 
complement or update the QoG dataset. The data on gender quotas is collected from the 
Quotaproject database and data on women’s representation from the Inter Parliamentary 
Union’s database. The credibility of the data sources is believed to be high, but as always the 
trustworthy could and should be questioned. However, the databases used are commonly used 
and widely recognized in the literature hence considered to be trustworthy. 
3.1.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Women’s representation 2011 
Women’s representation in this thesis refers to women’s descriptive representation if nothing 
else is explicitly defined. The norm within research on women’s descriptive representation is 
to operationalise the concept as the proportion of the total members of the national 
parliament’s single or lower chamber who are women (IPU 2012). This thesis uses the 
established operationalization hence the validity is considered high. The QoG cross-section 
standard dataset includes measures of women’s representation collected during the mid 2000s. 
The data measuring women’s representation 2011 is therefore collected from IPU’ database 
                                                 
22
 According to Sirkin (2006:66) operationalizations is “a definition of the way someone or something will be 
measured to determine the subject’s score on a variable”. Sirkin (2006:73) defines validity as “the extent to 
which the concept one wishes to measure is actually being measures by a particular scale or index”. Validity is 
defined as “the likelihood that the scale is actually measuring what it is supposed to measure” (Sirkin 2006:75) 
23
 The QoG, IPU, and the Quotaproject databases are described in appendix, for the interested reader. 
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(2012). The variable included in this thesis is the IPU’s measures from the 31st of December 
2011 which was the most recent data at the moment of my data collection.  
 
Women’s representation 2001 
By controlling for level of representation years 2001 the predictions measure the estimated 
impact of the independent variables on women’s representation during the last decade. The 
lagged dependent variable furthermore functions as an indirect control of independent 
variables effecting women’s representation. Those independent variables affecting women’s 
representation in 2001, and is assumed to have been constant during the following ten years, 
are controlled for by women’s representation 2001. Hence, factors such as region, religion, a 
country’s level of economic, social, and political development, social norms, women’s 
participation in workforce, fertility rates, women’s level of education, are all factors which are 
not assumed to have changed drastically during the last decade but are rather assumed to have 
been more or less constant at country-level.   
In other words, by controlling for women’s representation 2001 the lagged dependent variable 
controls for all mechanism held constant during 2001-2011 but had impact on women’s 
representation 2001. Things which are assumed to have been constant during 2001-2011, but 
still believed to have had impact on women’s representation 2011 are not controlled for. Level 
of democracy is one such thing that probably been constant, but as described above, it is 
believed that more non-democratic regimes have high levels of women MPs in 2011 than in 
2001. Therefore regime type is not controlled for by women’s representation 2001, even if the 
variable is assumed to have been constant during the last decade. 
 
The choice of year for control is based on two important arguments:  First, the conference in 
Beijing 1995 and the Platform for Action marks the starting-point of international 
encouragement of the adoption of gender quotas as a tool to increase the proportion of women 
in national parliaments. The following decade includes a remarkable increase in number of 
countries adopting gender quotas (Caul 2001, Dahlerup 2006, Tripp and Kang 2008, 
Schwindt-Bayer 2009). It is argued, however, that the effects of quotas on women’s 
representation have a time-delayed effect. For instance Araujo and Garcia (2006:100) show in 
their study of the effects of gender quotas in Latin America that the effects of gender quotas 
were larger in countries experiencing two elections after the quota adoption, compared to the 
countries only experiencing one election after the quota adoption.  
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Second, most of the research studying the impacts of gender quotas do not control for the 
effects on the changes in women’s descriptive representation. Paxton et al (2010) study the 
effects of gender quotas between 1975 to 2000, thus most probably do not capture the effects 
caused in countries adopting gender quotas after the Beijing Conference 1995. The validity of 
the variable is considered high, as a consequence of all above mentioned arguments. 
 
The lagged dependent variable is collected from the IPU’s measure of women’s 
representation on the 5
th
 of December 2011.  
2.3.3 Reversed causality? 
In the literature on factors contributing to the adoption of gender quotas, a country’s level of 
women in the national parliament is sometimes mentioned as a factor. According to Caul 
(2001:1216), the number of women in politics in general and parliament in particular 
contributed to the adoption of gender quotas in. Thus, there is a risk of reversed causality of 
the focal relationship studied in this thesis. The risk should be kept in mind, but not 
overestimated since most studies argue that gender quotas contributes to increased levels of 
women MPs.  
 
Gender Quotas 
The variables measuring the different quota types are based on data from the Quotaproject 
database (2012). More specified details on the quota variables are described below
24
. The 
reliability of the quota variable is expected to be fairly high, since it is based on established 
research finings on gender quotas. What might decrease the reliability is that the 
categorisation is not yet an established measurement in quantitative research due to the newly 
established database found at Quotaproject.org.  
 
Reserved seats 
The variable measuring the gender quota type reserved seats includes all 196 countries in the 
QoG dataset. 18 countries have been coded 1, the remaining countries 0. 1 equals the country 
has reserved seats, 0 equals reserved seats do not exist. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 In case of interest, the codebook and dataset could be received from the author. 
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Legislated candidate quotas 
The variable measuring legislated candidate quotas includes all 196 countries found in the 
QoG dataset. 40 countries have been coded 1 and the remaining countries 0. 1 equals 
legislated candidate quotas exist, 0 equals legislated candidate quotas do not exist. 
 
Voluntary party quotas 
The variable measuring voluntary party quotas includes all 196 countries found in the QoG 
dataset. 50 countries have been coded 1, the remaining countries 0. 1 equals voluntary party 
quotas exist, 0 voluntary party quotas do not exist.  
 
Implications of the operationalization of gender quotas 
There are several quantitative studies on the impact of gender quotas on women’s descriptive 
representation (Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, Dahlerup 
2006, Krook 2003, etc). However, it is a field of research currently under development. One 
of the implications is related to research methodology. One of the obstacles for this thesis was 
the absence of consensus on how to measure gender quotas in quantitative studies; some 
studies include only a dichotomous version of the quota variable. Other studies include only 
the legislated candidate quotas and pay attention to the implementation process instead. Yet 
other focus on which level of the political system the quotas target., just to mention some 
examples (see for instance Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, 
Dahlerup 2008).  
 
A lot of time and effort was therefore devoted into finding theoretically proper 
operationalizations in terms of analysing the research questions. There are a wide number of 
contextual factors and institutional mechanism argued to affect the impact of gender quotas. 
In fact this theoretical quota “jungle” is so complex there is a need of simplifying the concept 
as much as possible meanwhile still capturing the most important characteristics.  
 
After the literature study of gender quotas, the decision fell to use operationalizations 
capturing whether or not the quota is voluntary or legislated by law/constitution. The quota 
variable also needed to separate reserves seats which target the parliamentary level in the 
electoral process, from quotas which target the candidate level.
25
 According to theory these 
                                                 
25
 Thus I exclude for instance to separate the aspirant level from the candidate level, which for instance 
Dahlerup (2006) encourages to.  
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are the most important mechanisms in terms of gender quotas’ impact on women’s 
representation in analysis of cross-country differences. 
 
Regime type 
As gender quota scholars elucidate, the adoption of gender quotas have occurred worldwide 
and in all types of regimes (Dahlerup 2007, Krook 2003). Hence, even if there is no consensus 
whether to include regime type in studies of women’s representation, the fact that quotas have 
become a widespread phenomenon even in semi- and non-democratic regimes is reason 
enough to include regime type as an independent variable. To measure regime type, the 
Freedom House variable Polity/Democracy imputed version found in the QoG cross-section 
dataset from 2011, was used
26
 (QoG 2012). The variable is an index of the countries’ average 
values on Freedom House’s variables measuring civil liberties and political rights. The index 
used to measure polity/democracy is transformed into a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 equals the 
least democratic and 10 the most democratic. In order to capture the effects of the regime type 
in reference to each other I have coded the index in three categories: democratic regime type, 
semi-democratic regime type, and non-democratic regime type. The democratic category 
includes countries scoring from 7-10 on the democracy index. The semi-democratic countries 
scores 3-6 on the democracy index. Non-democratic countries are those scoring 0-2 on the 
democracy index. This categorisation is similar to the one used by Tripp and Kang 
(2008:348). 
 
It could be argue the categorization is too broad, and that there are more than three types of 
regimes. However, in regression analysis there is a risk of using too many independent. This 
thesis, however, is rather interested in analysing the general trends of the impact of regime 
types than the specific impact. Therefore the validity of the variable could be considered as 
high.  
 
Electoral system 
One of the most influential explanatory factors to the level of women’s representation is the 
country’s electoral system (see for instance Wängnerud 2009:54). This thesis includes three 
dummy variable measuring electoral systems; PR, mixed, and majority systems. The majority 
dummy also includes plurality electoral systems. There are several variables measuring 
                                                 
26
 The variable is coded as fh_ipolity2 in the QoG dataset. 
 32 
electoral system in the QoG standard dataset (2011). The choice fell on the variable iaep_es 
from the Institutions and Elections Project at Binghamton University, because of its large 
sample of countries and because the variable was the one closest to the operationalization 
used in the thesis. The original variable contains four categories, separating majority and 
plurality systems. Majority and plurality are transformed into one variable.  
 
The variable measuring electoral systems is broad. However, the purpose of this thesis is to 
analyse the general impact of the characteristics of electoral systems, and since the most 
important features of the electoral systems in analysis of women’s representation to be 
included on my operationalization the validity is considered high. 
 
Structural and cultural factors 
According to theory, structural factors such as economics development, women’s education, 
and the proportion of women included in the workforce, may have effect on women’s 
descriptive representation. In order to capture the overall impact from structural factors, the 
human development index (HDI) was used. The UNDP’s HDI, is a composite index which 
measures the countries’ average development based of three dimension; long and healthy life, 
knowledge, and decent living standards. The variable includes life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy rate, enrolments for primary, secondary, and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars. In a sense the HDI is expected to be the outcome 
of social norms, hence it is also an indirect control of cultural factors with potential impact on 
women’s representation. 
 
The HDI is a very broad control variable, meaning it controls for overall development rather 
than specific factors such as women’s participation in workforce. Using HDI could be 
criticized for being too broad, and therefore not being able to capture specific factors affecting 
women’s representation. In cross-country studies with large-n sample, such as this one, the 
broad content of HDI could be considered a strength as it controls for a large amount of 
important indicators of a country’s level of development. It would give regression models 
rather impossible to overview, if each and every variable that is included in the HDI were 
controlled for individually. Therefore the reliability of the HDI is considered to be high as a 
control variable for structural, and to some extent even cultural, factors theoretically argued to 
have impact on women’s representation. HDI is coded as undp_hdi in the QoG standard 
 33 
dataset (2011). The HDI was transformed into two dummy variables indicating whether the 
country falls below or above the mean. 
 
Culture is more specifically operationalized as religion in this thesis, just as it is in Ingelhart 
and Norris (2003). According the Inglehart and Norris, Islam is negatively correlated to 
women’s representation. The variables measuring religion are found in the QoG standard 
dataset (2011) and are an estimation of the proportion of countries in each country belonging 
to Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, and “other” religions. The variables are coded as 
lp_muslim80, lp_catho80, lp_protmg80, and lp_no_cpm80 in the QoG dataset.  
 
It could be argued that religion is not at fully satisfying operationalization of the concept of 
culture. However, it is a commonly used definition therefore I consider the validity to be high. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Research design 
In order to answer the research questions which include a global, cross-country perspective, 
statistical design is probably the only realistic design to use. By using statistical methodology 
enables analysing large amounts of data, and to study the global impact of gender quotas 
under control for other relevant factors (institutional, structural, and cultural). Most previous 
research on women’s representation and gender quotas are conducted with qualitative 
methods or quantitative methods with small-n sample (Krook 2009:5). It could therefore be 
argued that the field of research is more suitable for qualitative studies. However, the 
quantitative character of the research questions more or less demands statistical analysis. 
Furthermore, since a growing field of research on the link between women’s descriptive and 
substantive representation using quantitative methods, the impact of gender quotas is 
necessary to include thus quantitative studies of the impact of gender quotas are crucial. This 
thesis contributes to the field of research showing that gender quotas could easily be a part of 
large-n statistical analysis. 
3.2.2 Disposition of analysis 
The analysis will be presented in two main sections. The first section could be described as an 
operationalization of the theory section. The first section provides the reader with descriptive 
statistics and bivariate analyses of the variables which are included in the thesis. The purpose 
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is to familiarize the reader with data and the variables included in the regression analysis in 
section two, and more specifically to answer research question number one. The tables and 
figures included in section one illustrate the distribution of countries along the established 
variables categorized in accordance with gender quota type, which assists our understanding 
in the interpretation of the results in section two. Section two includes regression analysis 
using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. The purpose of section two is to answer 
research questions number two and three. 
 
The results in section two will be the primary basis of which the conclusions of this thesis’ 
contributions to the research and public debate will be drawn. The regression models 
presented in section two illustrates the impact of gender quotas under control for the factors 
which according to conventional wisdom explains cross-country variation in women’s 
representation. The regression analyses the cross-section effects as well as the effects on 
changed levels of women’s representation during the last decade by controlling for women’s 
representation 2001. 
3.2.3 Reliability 
As always there is a risk of unsystematic mistakes during the working process. An additional 
risk in this thesis is the fact that the author have to a large extent collected, recoded and 
transformed the data used. A lot of work has been spent on the data processing. These 
procedures have been necessary in order to conduct the thesis, and to be able to answer the 
research questions. The author’s awareness of the risk of mistakes is high, and has 
consequentially been as accurate as possible during the working process. The variable 
transformations have been double checked, some mistakes have been found and corrected, 
thus believe the risk of mistakes seriously affecting the statistical analysis to be small. 
3.2.4 External validity 
The results in this thesis have large potential to be generalized into broader terms. If countries 
that do not have gender quotas at the moment, decide to adopt quotas the impact would 
probably be similar to the results of this thesis, taking into consideration the country 
characteristics as well as quota type. Since this analysis uses large-n sample and gender 
quotas are expected to be adopted in all types of regimes, the external validity of this thesis is 
expected to be high. 
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3.2.5 Regression analysis 
In the field of statistical analysis, there are several useful methodological tools for analysing 
large amount of data. Considering my aim to analyse the impact of gender quotas on women’s 
representation over time (2001-2011), time-series regression might be the first hand choice to 
many. After considering the advantages and disadvantages to use time-series analysis 
compared to those of Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) with a lagged dependent 
variable and complementary descriptive/bivariate analysis, the choice fell on the later for two 
main reasons:  
 
First, the time-perspective of interest in my thesis includes only ten years. Furthermore, since 
the research questions focus on the women’s representation at one point of time; 2011, but 
instead aims at control the changes during the last decade, OLS seemed most usable. The 
development as such is not of interest in this thesis, but rather which factors are relevant in 
terms of the changed proportion of women MPs the last ten years. 
 
Second, the theoretical framework surrounding gender quotas is complex. Therefore, it was 
important to simplify the analysis as much as possible without compromising with the quality 
of the analysis. OLS with a lagged dependent variable provides easily understandable 
statistical analysis. The descriptive and bivariate statistical analysis aims at simplifying the 
issue as well. 
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4. ANALYSIS 
By using the theoretical framework provided in previous sections, and using the statistical 
methodology described above, this section aims at answer the research questions by 
presenting the results of the analysis. 
 
Research Questions 
1. Which types of countries have adopted gender quotas? 
2. Have gender quotas changed levels of women’s representation descriptive 
representation from 2001 to 2011? 
3. Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type?  
 
4.1 Section 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis 
Section 1 provides bivariate analysis and descriptive statistics. The conclusions from the 
results will be described right after the results are presented since the conclusions from 
section 1 are needed to be aware of in section 2’s regression analysis.  
4.1.1 Dependent variable: Women’s representation 
Scholars agree that women’s representation has experienced some interesting increase at 
country-level since the issue was highlighted in the beginning of the 1990s (see for instance 
Wängnerud 2009, Norris 2000, or Matland 1998). This thesis treat women’s representation 
year 2011 as the dependent variable, hence the underlying purpose of all tables and figures is 
to, directly or indirectly, explain the proportion of women MPs in national parliaments in 
December 2011. So, if the countries are grouped together in accordance to quota type, which 
are the average levels of women’s representation today? And equally interesting, which were 
the average levels in these countries a decade ago in 2001, before the effects from gender 
quotas in the developing countries is believed to have occurred? Figure X.1 below illustrates 
the proportion of women in the national parliament in 2011 (dark grey piles) and 2001 (light 
grey piles): 
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Figure 4.1 Women’s representation 2011 and 2001 
 
Comment: The proportion of women in the single or lower chamber 2011 and 2001 measured as percent of the 
total number of members of parliament. Based on IPU’s measures. The countries are grouped in accordance with 
quota belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary 
party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 
2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Source: 
IPU (2011) and QoG Standard dataset time-series (2001) 
 
As we see in figure 4.1, women’s representation has increased in all five categories of 
countries:  in terms of average world level, countries with quotas, and in countries without 
quotas. The most remarkable increase has occurred in the countries having the reserved seats 
gender quota. Women’s representation has more than doubled that past ten years in these 
countries: from an average of 9.3 percent women MPs in 2001, to an average of 23.5 percent 
in 2011. Furthermore, another interesting observation is that the countries having 
implemented reserved seats have the highest average of women’s representation out of the 
five categories today, but had the lowest average of women MPs in 2001. It seems like 
women’s representation and reserved seats are correlated, and if the regression analysis shows 
they are could the starting-point of women’s representation in year 2001 be correlated to the 
effects of reserved seats in terms of increased levels of women’s representation the following 
decade? The possibility of an interaction effect between women’s representation in 2001 and 
gender quota type will be analysed in section two’s regression analysis. 
 
In the group of countries having legislated candidate quotas, women’s representation has in 
average increased with 10.5 percentage points during the last decade. The countries having 
voluntary party quotas have in average experienced 7 percentage points increased levels 
during the same period, an increase slightly below the average global increase of 7.7 
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percentage points. However, yet another indication of the possible effect from gender quotas 
in terms of increased levels of women MPs the last ten years, is the average increase in 
countries without any type of quota: 3.8 percentage points. 
 
Conclusions to be drawn from figure 4.1 would be as follow: During the last ten years, 
women’s representation has experienced some remarkable increases. Especially interesting 
increases have occurred in countries having gender quotas, confirming the importance of 
analysis the effects from gender quotas in relation to the established explanatory variables to 
women’s representation, in section two.  
 
Before the focus turns towards the independent variables, the country-level variation in terms 
of changed levels of women’s representation during the last decade will be looked upon. 
Table 4.1 analyses the variation at the dependent variable women’s representation 2011 under 
control for the levels of women MPs 2001, when the countries are groups in accordance with 
gender quota types: 
 
Table 4.1 Change in levels of women's representation 2001 - 2011 (percentage points) 
 Average change Min. Max. 
Reserved seats 13.4 -0.7 30.3 
Leislated candidate quotas 10.8 -1.5 27.2 
Voluntary party quotas 6.8 -9.10 30.2 
World 6.9 -13.7 43.0 
Without quotas 4.79 -13.7 43.0 
Comment: The figure illustrates the differences in women’s representation from year 2001 to year 2011 at 
country-level, grouped after quota type. The variable measures the differences in proportion of women in the 
single or lower chamber 2011 subtracted by the level for year 2001, thus the variable should be understood in 
percentage points. The countries are grouped in accordance with quota belonging. The quota types included in 
the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization 
on quotaproject.org. Sources: Women’s representation 2011 and 2001: IPU (2011) and QoG standard dataset 
time-series (2001), Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed 
information about how the variables are coded.  
 
In table 4.1 the differences in proportion of women MPs at country-level during the period 
2001 – 2011 is revealed. The table shows the range of the variable measuring the changed 
levels seen from the different quota types and the global average. The table’s contribution to 
the thesis is first and foremost that it reveals even decreased levels of women in the national 
parliaments during the period –even in countries with gender quotas. Thus the dependent 
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variable women’s representation year 2011 contains considerable internal variation under 
control for women’s representation ten years earlier. The minimum values for changed levels 
in women’s representation within the groups of countries having the reserved seats and 
legislated candidate quotas, indicate that the country with largest decrease in women’s 
representation in each group has not decreased as much as the corresponding countries within 
the voluntary party quotas group of countries and the world. Could reserved seats and 
legislated candidate quotas possibly contribute to a moderating effect? 
 
Furthermore, the average change in women’s representation is higher among the countries 
having reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas than the average change in countries 
having voluntary party quotas or compared to the global average. Could this perhaps be an 
indication that reserved seats and legislated quotas contribute a leverage effect in terms of 
women’s representation? The regression analysis in section two sheds light on this question. 
Furthermore, as understood from table x.1 gender quotas alone do not provide enough power 
as to explain all of the changes in women’s representation. Therefore, it is essential to 
consider the effects from gender quotas from a larger perspective, meaning in comparison to 
the established variables explaining women’s representation included in this thesis. Below, 
the independent variables will be described, seen from quota type point of view. 
4.1.2 Independent variables 
4.1.2.1 Gender Quotas 
Since the Beijing Conference on women in 1995 concluded in agreement Platform for Action 
which encouraged countries to adopt gender quotas, there has been a remarkable increase in 
number of countries adopting gender quotas. However, as we remember from the theory 
section, gender quotas are not a uniform institutional arrangement. This thesis includes the 
categorization of three quota types; reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary 
party quotas. Each of which type is argued to have different effect on women’s representation. 
Below we will look at the factors which according to the conventional wisdom effects 
women’s representation, seen from a perspective where the countries are aggregated 
accordance with quota belonging. The purpose of grouping the countries in accordance with 
gender quota type is to answer the first research question: 
 
1. Which types of countries have gender quotas?  
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Furthermore, the first research question serves the purpose to develop awareness about 
whether certain types of countries have the same type of quota, but also share the same 
attributes concerning the established factors explaining women’s representation. 
 
Figure 4.2 Number of countries categorised after gender quota type  
 
Comment: The table illustrates the number of countries having the different quota types. 18 countries have 
reserved seats, 40 countries have legislated candidate quotas, 50 countries have voluntary party quotas. Because 
there are a number of countries having more than one type of, the total number of countries having quotas is 
lower than if you add the variable values of the three quota types together.  106 countries in the world have at 
least one type of gender quotas. The number of countries included in the study is the countries included in the 
QoG standard dataset (2011).  Source: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed 
information about how the variables are coded. QoG standard dataset 2011. 
a
there are only 15 countries having 
two types of gender quotas, this should not effect the results in this thesis and is therefore not included 
 
Figure 4.2 reveals first of all, slightly more than half of the countries in the world have 
adopted some type of gender quotas: 54 percent based on the countries included in this thesis 
(106 out of 196 countries). Secondly, the table shows that most common type of quota is the 
voluntary party quotas, which almost one-fourth of the countries have adopted (50 out of 106 
countries). Legislated candidate quotas are the second most common, adopted in almost one-
fifth of the countries worldwide (40 out of 106 countries). Reserved seats, which is considered 
to be the most powerful and most controversial type of quota, is adopted in nine percent of the 
countries (18 out of 106 countries). 
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4.1.2.2 Gender Quotas and the Regime Types 
Included in this thesis are three regime types; democratic, semi-democratic, and non-
democratic regimes. The categorization is based on Freedom House’s democracy index which 
is a scale of the counties the civil liberties and political rights.
27
 The field of research studying 
women’s representation and gender quotas is not fully convinced that a country’s democratic 
status have an effect on women’s representation (see for instance Paxton et al 2010). 
However, the theory section outlined both theoretical and empirical arguments to include 
regime type as an independent variable in the regression model. The importance of 
considering the impact of regime type is furthermore highlighted in table 4.2: 
 
Table 4.2 Quota Type and Regime Type (%) 
Type of quota 
Reserved 
seats 
Legislated 
candidate 
quotas 
Voluntary 
party quotas World 
Democratic 0 % 65 % 82 % 55 % 
Semi-Democratic 40 % 16 % 9 % 21 % 
Non-Democratic 60 % 19 % 9 % 24 % 
Total  100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Comments: The table illustrates the distribution of the proportion of countries being democratic, semi-
democratic, and non-democratic regimes, categorised by gender quota belonging. The variable values represent 
the percent of the total number of countries having the specific regime type, within the quota type sample. The 
sample of reserved seats is 15 countries, legislated candidate quotas’ sample is 31 countries, and the country 
sample for voluntary candidate quotas is 45. Regime types included are democratic, semi-democratic, or non-
democratic regimes. Regime type is based on Freedom House measure of democracy index where I have 
categorized the values 7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic 
regimes. The countries are categorized in accordance with which quota type they have adopted. The quota types 
included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s 
categorization on quotaproject.org. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook 
Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Regime type: QoG 2012 fh_ipolity2. 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates that within the group of countries having reserved seats, 60 percent are 
non-democratic regimes, 40 percent are semi-democratic, but there are no democratic 
countries. The distribution of regime types within the group of countries having legislated 
candidate quotas differs remarkably from the countries with reserved seats. Out of the 
countries with legislated quotas, 65 percent are democratic regimes, 16 percent semi-
democratic regimes, and 19 percent non-democratic regimes. Even more different form the 
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 The democratic category includes countries scoring from 7-10 on the Freedom House democracy index. The 
semi-democratic countries scores 3-6 on the democracy index. Non-democratic countries are those scoring 0-2 
on the democracy index. 
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distribution of countries having reserved seats, is the regime type distribution within the group 
of countries having voluntary party quotas: 82 percent are democratic regimes meanwhile 
only nine percent have the semi-democratic and as many non-democratic regimes. The table 
also reveals the global distribution of countries along the regime type variable (World 
category). 
 
So, which conclusions can be drawn from table 4.2? First, the table confirms the fact that 
gender quotas are adopted by all types of regimes. However, what is furthermore striking in 
this table is the fact that the different types of quotas seem to be adopted to a smaller or larger 
degree by different regime types. Reserves seats for instance, are primarily adopted by non-
democratic countries. Consequently non-democratic regimes tend to adopt the type of gender 
quotas which according to theory are most efficient in increasing the level of women’s 
descriptive representation. This somewhat surprising observation is interesting observation for 
a number of reasons. How is it even possible that autocratic leaders in non-democratic 
regimes agree to adopt the most efficient method in terms of gender quotas? If the only reason 
is to signal to the international community they have listened and responded to the 
international recommendation to adopt gender quotas, legislated candidate quotas would 
probably be preferable because it is a less powerful type of quota according to research. 
However, by adopting reserved seats, there most probably are other factors behind.  
4.1.2.3 Gender Quota Types and Electoral Systems 
Next table illustrate the distribution of countries along the dummy variables measuring 
electoral systems. The countries are groups in accordance with quota type, and the global 
average is included for the purpose of showing the average for the world. According to 
research the combination of PR electoral system and gender quotas should have most 
favourable for women’s representation (see for instance Tripp and Kang 2008:338). 
Furthermore, generally the effect from PR is one of the strongest explanatory variables for 
explaining women’s representation. Majority electoral systems (which also include plurality 
system in this thesis) are usually considered to be an institutional barrier preventing women 
from being elected to the parliament (Paxton et al 2010:43). The purpose of showing how the 
countries are distributed on the dummy variable electoral system is to see whether the variable 
contains internal variation as well as to see if there are some interesting patterns of country 
distribution in relation to the quota types. 
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Table 4.3 Quota type and electoral system (% countries) 
 
Reserved 
seats 
Legislated 
candidate 
quotas 
Voluntary 
party 
quotas World 
PR 20 % 51 % 43 % 33 % 
Mixed 13 % 35 % 38 % 31 % 
Majority 67 % 14 % 19 % 36 % 
Total  100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Comment: The table illustrates the proportion of quota countries having PR, Mixed or Majority electoral 
systems, analysed in accordance with quota type. The dummy variable measuring majority electoral system also 
includes plurality systems. The reserved seats’ percentage is based on a 15 country sample, the country sample 
for legislated candidate quotas is 37 countries, and voluntary party quotas percentage is based on 47 countries. 
The column percent illustrates the distribution of the different electoral systems based on the total proportion of 
quota countries, irrespective of type. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate 
and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. Sources: Quota variables: 
Electoral system: QoG Standard dataset, cross-section 2011 variable iaep_es. Quotaproject.org 2012, please see 
codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that the world’s countries are almost equally distributed along the electoral 
systems. In terms of gender quota types however, the pattern is somewhat different. As we see 
PR electoral system is the most common type of electoral system in both Legislated candidate 
quota countries and in countries with voluntary party quotas. As we know from previous 
research PR is the electoral system most favourable to gender quotas. Furthermore, the two 
quota types, especially the voluntary quota, are least efficient in order to increase the 
descriptive representation. Thus the combination of PR and quotas in the countries belonging 
to the two types might contribute to a combined effect on the number of women MPs. That is 
however an issue for the regression analysis in section 2 to deal with. The mixed electoral 
system type is not much to say about, the reader could on your own reflect upon the variable 
values if interested.  
 
Rather more interesting is however to look at the majority electoral system type; we see that 
two-thirds of the countries with reserved seats have majority systems. This is somewhat 
interesting considering that the reserved seats is the most efficient quota type to increase the 
level of women MPs, meanwhile majority system is electoral system contributing to least 
women in the parliament according to (Matland and Studlar 1996:707). Furthermore, as we 
remember from the theory section earlier, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005:36) claimed that 
quota systems “undoubtedly” are more compatible with PR electoral systems than majority 
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systems
28
. Does this mean that the effect from reserved seats is pulled back by majority 
electoral system in the countries having it? Well, this is what I aim to find out in the 
regression analysis in section two.  
4.1.2.4 Structural factors as independent variables 
The economic and societal development is sometimes held forward as mechanism underlying 
women’s representation. During the 1960s and 70s a country’s economic development was 
perceived as the most powerful explanatory factor to women’s descriptive representation. 
However, today it is more common to perceive for instance the degree of women’s 
participation in the workforce as a stronger indicator of the number of women MPs 
(Storckmer and Byrne 2011). The importance of structural factors is however far from 
conventional wisdom in research on women’s representation. Due to the characteristic of this 
thesis, where my primary aim is to analyse the effect from gender quotas on the changed 
levels of women’s descriptive representation during the last decade using a global, cross-
country design based on large-n sample of countries, structural factors are controlled by using 
a dichotomous version of the HDI. HDI is, as we remember from the data and methodology 
section, an overall measure of a country’s human development operationalized from the three 
dimensions of long and healthy life, knowledge and decent living standards (UNDP 2012). 
The idea behind the structural factors is that of the empowerment of women; some scholars 
believe women’s representation is the outcome of empowered women, which in turn is caused 
by overall societal –or human- development. The bar chart below illustrates the proportion of 
countries grouped by gender quota type, scoring higher than (lighter piles) or lower (darker 
piles) than the global average of HDI
29
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 It should be noted however, that after Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s study (2005) there has been a significant 
number of countries that have adopted reserved seats thus we cannot be sure Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s 
statement is still valid. 
29
 The HDI is divided in two halves of each side of the global average HDI of 0.7. 
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Figure 4.3 Level of development within the Quota types (HDI) 
 
Comment: Figure 4.3 illustrates the percent of countries’ distributed on the dichotomous version of the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index (HDI). The countries are grouped in accordance with gender quota type, the global 
average is also included as a reference category. The HDI dichotomous variable is the HDI divided in two halves 
of each side of the global average HDI of 0.7. The countries are categorised after gender quota type belonging. 
The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on 
Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. The category World represents all of the world’s countries that 
are included in this thesis. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 
for detailed information about how the variables are coded. HDI is based on undp_hdi found in the QoG standard 
dataset (2011). 
 
Figure 4.3 reveals some interesting patterns in terms of the country distribution along the 
dichotomous HDI variable. Out of the countries with the reserves seats type of quota, the 
majority have an HDI below the global average. If Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s two ideal types 
to women’s representation (fast track and incremental track) are recalled, the low levels of 
HDI would place reserves seats countries close to the fast track ideal type if the regression 
analysis indicated effects from reserves seats on women’s representation. The fast track 
implies that women’s representation increase as a consequence of gender quotas rather than 
human development; whereas the incremental track to women’s representation predict human 
development to precede women’s representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).  
 
The countries with legislated candidate quotas indicate similar pattern however the proportion 
of countries below the global average at HDI is smaller than the proportion of countries 
having reserved seats. The stark contrast to the countries with reserved seats and legislated 
candidate quotas is the HDI among the countries having voluntary party quotas; more than 
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two-thirds of the countries with voluntary party quotas have HDI above the global average. 
Once again Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s ideal types to women’s representation are useful to 
consider. If the regression analyses do not indicate any effect from the voluntary candidate 
quotas I would suggest that most of these countries are closer to the ideal type incremental 
track to women’s representation thus women’s representation do not change as easy as it does 
in fast track countries.
30
 
4.1.2.5 Cultural factors as independent variables 
Inglehart and Norris (2003), argue culture and religion are important factors for women’s 
representation. Table 4.4 below shows the average percentage of population within the 
countries grouped according to quota types belonging to Catholicism, Islam, “Other 
religion”31, or Protestantism and in the world. 
 
Table 4.4 Quota Type and Religion 
Type of quota 
Reserved 
seats 
Legislated 
candidate 
quotas 
Voluntary 
party 
quotas World 
Catholic  15 % 52 % 45 % 31 % 
Islam  60 % 20 % 10 % 24 % 
Other 22 % 23 % 30 % 32 % 
Protestant  3 % 5 % 15 % 13 % 
Total percent (%) 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Comment: The table shows how many percent of the population in the countries belonging to relevant gender 
quota type who are Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, or other religious belonging. Sources: Quota variables: 
Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are 
coded. The variables measuring religion are lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and lp_no_cpm80 in the 
QoG standard dataset (2011). The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and 
voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. The global average is based on 
the countries included in the QoG standard dataset (2011) lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and 
lp_no_cpm80 
 
                                                 
30
 It might appear strange that the world do not have two equally high piles. However, this is because the HDI is 
split based on the global average and not the world median. Second, most countries in the world actually scores 
above the global average HDI. This means that the countries having reserved seats and legislated candidate 
quotas are not representative sample of the world. The fact that the countries with the most efficient types of 
gender quotas are not a representative sample of the world’s countries highlights the importance of considering 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s (2005) two tracks to women’s representation, the fast and the incremental track. 
31
 This thesis will not go further into detail on the categorisation of  ”other” religion due to its theoretically 
expected limited effect on women’s representation. This variable is solely based on the categorisation found in 
the QoG standard dataset (2011). One could however, raise some criticism over label the largest category “other” 
instead of specifying more thoroughly. That is however the issue of a totally different context. 
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In countries with reserves seats Islam is the by far most common religion. Within legislated 
quotas most people seem to be Catholics, meanwhile the proportion of people is more evenly 
distributed in countries having voluntary party quotas. 
4.2 Section 2: Regression analysis  
The statistical analysis includes three regression models: 
 
Model 1 
The first regression model includes the established variables claimed to explain women’s 
representation. These are: electoral systems, regime types, HDI, and religion. In addition to 
the established variables, the first model also includes gender quotas. The expected findings 
include e.g. positive effect from electoral system PR, negative impact from Islam. Whether 
gender quotas have effect   
 
Model 2 
Includes all the mentioned variables above, but also women’s representation 2001 as an 
independent variable. By controlling for women’s representation ten years ago, the aim is to 
analyse the impact of gender quotas during these years. Women’s representation 2001 also is 
an indirect control for several other independent variables. More about this is described in 
next section: 
 
Model 3  
At a first glance at model 3 it could appear to be of limited importance due to the fact that it 
only includes gender quotas, electoral systems, regime types, and women’s representation 
2001 as control variables. However, the variable women’s representation 2001 is an indirect 
control of country-specific mechanisms which do not easily change over time. These variables 
includes for instance social norms and religion (cultural factors), as well as women’s 
participation in the workforce, women’s level of education, HDI, (structural factors), etc. 
These are factors that have been more or less constant during the last ten years, thus it could 
be argued the variables do not need to be individually included in the regression model. 
Rather since these variables are held constant by nature from 2001 to 2011, it could be 
motivated the exclusion of these variables do not effect the predictions. Thus the independent 
variables contributing to the level of women’s representation 2001 that have not changed the 
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last decade, would most probably have the same impact on women’s representation 2011 and 
therefore do not demand further control. 
 
One could argue however that electoral system and regime type also should have been 
constant during this period. However, according to theory both electoral system and regime 
type seem to be important for the impact of gender quotas thus contributes possible 
interaction effects
32
. Therefore, model 3 includes the variables and also control for potential 
interaction effects. Thus I would argue that model 3 is the most valid of the three models thus 
the most specified. Something the regression diagnostics also confirmed. 
 
Necessary to write is the fact that regression analysis cannot control for causality, thus there is 
always a risk of reverse causality correlated with the choice of dependent variable. Instead I 
have to trust previous research in my choice of dependent variable. However, since model 2 
and 3 control the change in women’s representation between 2001 and 2011, the risk is even 
smaller in these models. 
 
The results from the regression analysis will be presented on the next page. 
                                                 
32
 The interaction term reflects the extent to which the effect of two variables together differs from the effect of 
each one independently. The classic example to illustrate how an interaction effect works is 1+1=3. Variable 1 
and variable 1 separate from each other would sum 2. But if the variable 1 and variable 1 interacts with each 
other, their value together equals 3. 
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Table 4.5 Regression analysis (OLS). Dependent variable: Women’s representation in 
national parliament 2011 (% of total). (Standard errors) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Type of Quota: (ref. No quota)    
Reserved Seats 8.1^(4.81) 7.4* (3.21) 7.4* (2.98) 
Legislated Candidate Quotas 2.8 (2.74) 3.1^ (1.83) 3.3* (1.58) 
Voluntary Party Quotas .5 (2.14) -.3 (1.43) -.1 (1.37) 
Electoral System (ref. Majority)    
PR 7. 4 **(2.42) 2.8^ (1.67) 3.2^ (1.625) 
Mixed 3.6 (2.48) 2.1 (1.66) 2.6 (.59) 
Regime Type: (ref. Democracy)    
Non-Democracy 2.9 (3.51) .1 (2.36) -.3 (2-04) 
Semi-Democracy -4.1 (2.95) -.7 (2.00) -.1 (1.77) 
Interaction effects    
Reserved Seats* Non-Democracy 7.9 (7.39) 10.9* (4.94) 11.3* (4.82) 
Legislated Candidate Quotas* Non-Democracy 9.2 (6.69) 9.7* (4.47) 8.8 *(4.10) 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS    
HDI 1.3 (6.15) -3.9 (4.13)  
CULTURAL FACTOR ( ref. Other religion)    
Islam -.1 (.04) .0 (.03)  
Catholicism .0 (.04) .0 (.02)  
Protestantism .2*** (.05) .0 (.04)  
CONTROL VARIABLE    
Women's representation 2001  1.0***(.09) 1.0***(.07) 
Constant 12.0* (5.83) 7.3^(3.91) 3.8^(1.97) 
N 102 102 104 
Adjusted R
2 .312*** .693*** .697*** 
Comment: Levels of significance: ^ ≤ 0,1, *p ≤ 0,05,  **p ≤ 0,005, ***p ≤ 0,001. The table illustrates the results from 
regression analysis (OLS) treating women’s representation 2011 as the dependent variable. Women’s representation includes 
the proportion of women members of the parliament in the single or lower chamber measured in percent thus the effects from 
the independent variables should be interpreted as percentage points. Because the table also includes women’s representation 
year 2001, the table results should be interpreted as the effect on country-level changes in women’s representation during the 
last decade. The gender quota variable is a dummy variable coded in order to treat countries without gender quotas as the 
reference category therefore the effect from countries without quotas are found in the constant. Included quota dummies are 
reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas each of which includes the countries having the quotas 
type. The effects shown in the table should be interpreted in reference to countries without gender quotas. Electoral system is 
also a dummy variable, treating majority (including plurality) electoral system as the reference category thus its effect is 
included in the constant, PR and mixed electoral systems’ effects are presented in the table and should be interpreted in 
reference to countries having majority electoral systems. In regime types democratic regimes is the reference category. The 
effects from the dummy variables non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes should be understood in reference to 
democratic regimes. The two interaction effect variables are computed variables. “Non-democratic*Reserved  Seats” has 
multiplied the non-democratic regime variable with the variable reserved seats. The effect should be interpreted as “if a 
country combines a non-democratic regime type with reserved seats the effects is as follows”. The interaction effect “Non-
democratic*Legislated Candidate Quotas” has multiplied the variable non-democratic regime type with the variable 
measuring legislated candidate quotas and the effect should be understood as the former interaction effect except from 
replacing reserves seats with legislated gender quotas. Structural factors are measured by the human development index 
(HDI) scale 0-1. Cultural is measured by religion. The variables measure the estimated proportion of the population at 
country-level who belong to the certain religions. Sources: Women’s representation 2011: IPU (December 31st 2011), 
Women’s representation 2001: QoG standard dataset time-series (2001).  Gender quotas: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see 
codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Electoral system, Regime type, HDI and 
religion: QoG standard dataset  cross-section(2011) iaep_es, fh_ipolity2 (7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic 
regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic regimes), undp_hdi, and lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and lp_no_cpm80 
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4.2.1 The models’ explanatory power 
The explanatory power is measured by the adjusted R
2
 and could be interpreted as how many 
percent of the variation in dependent variable women’s representation 2011 that is explained 
by the variables included in the regression model. Table 4.5 shows that the variables included 
in model 1 explain approximately 31 percent (.312) of the variation in the dependent variable. 
The explanatory power in model 2 and 3 is as expected high, as the two models both explain 
almost 70 percent (.693 and .697) of the changes in women’s representation between 2001 
and 2011. However, both models pass the Durbin-Watson test thus the high levels are not 
problematic. All three models are statistically significant at the 99 percentage safety level, 
thus we can trust the predictions to a large extent. 
4.2.2 Impact of gender quotas 
Table 4.5 first of all reveals the importance of dividing the different types of quotas in 
statistical analysis. The impact of gender quotas on women’s descriptive representation is 
different depending on which type of quota the countries have. The results will be discussed 
below in accordance with types of quota. 
4.2.2.1 Reserved seats 
As for the reserved seats quota type, model 1 does not indicate any significant impact on 
women’s representation (b-coefficient 8.12 is significant only at the 90 percentage level). The 
conclusion to be drawn is that at the moment reserved seats do not explain women’s 
representation in a broader context, i.e. cross-section analysis. However, the results in model 
2 and 3 indicate the explanatory power from reserved seats quotas might gain importance in 
the future: when controlling for the changed levels of women’s representation the last ten 
years, as is the case for model 2 and 3, the regression coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 95 percent level. Thus at the moment the impact of reserved seats has to be understood 
during a limited period of time. These results are in accordance with the theoretical 
expectations considering reserved seats increased popularity in the late 1990s-early 2000s and 
there are only a limited number of countries having reserved seats (Krook 2009).  
 
During the last decade reserved seats have had significant impact on the changed levels of 
women’s representation: the b-coefficients are 7.4 both in model 2 and model 3. Since the b-
coefficients could be interpreted as percent, and considering the variable is a dichotomous, the 
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results predicts an increase of more than 7 percentage points in countries having reserved 
seats during the last ten years. 
  
Even more interesting are the results from the variable measuring the impact of reserved seats 
in non-democratic regimes: during the last decade non-democratic regimes having reserved 
seats, have experienced an additional approximately 11 percentage points’ increase in the 
proportion of women MPs (the interaction effect in model 2 is 10.9 and 11.3 in model 3). 
Consequentially, my models predict an increase of 7+11=18
33
 percentage points’ increased 
level of women’s representation in non-democratic countries having reserved seats during the 
last ten years.  
 
The remarkable result that non-democratic regimes having reserved seats in general have 
increased the proportion of women MP with 18 percentage points during the last ten years is 
even more interesting if we recall the field of research arguing women’s representation is 
considered to be a step towards democratization in developing countries (Dahlerup 2006, 
Inglehart/Norris/Welzel 2002). Furthermore, these findings confirm Howell’s argument 
(2006) stating that non-democratic regimes have the capability to change structures fast due to 
the lack of checks-and-balances provided in democratic regimes. The possible contributions 
of the results will be discussed more in the concluding section below.  
4.2.2.2 Legislated candidate quotas 
The effect from legislated candidate quotas is only significant in model 3, where I argue the 
independent variable measuring women’s representation 2001 is an indirect control for 
structural and institutional factors. My interpretation of the result in model 1 is simply that 
legislated candidate quotas do not contribute to explain women’s representation seen from a 
cross-section perspective. In model 2 the impact from legislated candidate quotas is 
significant at the 90 percent level, thus I would not draw any further conclusions from the 
results. In model 3 however, the impact is statistically significant at the 95 percent level 
therefore pass the criteria for statistical significance in social sciences. My interpretation of 
the lack of significance in model 2 is that model 2 is too unspecified due to it includes religion 
and HDI as independent variable, meanwhile I argue both variables are indirectly controlled 
for through women’s representation 2001. According to the rules of regression diagnostics 
                                                 
33
 7+11=18 percentage points (Effect from reserved seats + effect from the interaction of reserved seats and non-
democratic regime = total effect from non-democratic regimes having reserved seats) 
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(Edling and Hedström 2003), regression models which are unspecified increases the risk of 
fallacious predictions. Of course one could argue model 3 breaks the regression diagnostic 
rule of all relevant variables should be included. However, since I argue all relevant variables 
are indirectly included in the variable measuring women’s representation 2001, my 
conclusion is that the lack of significant effect in model 2 is due to unspecified model. 
 
The impact of legislated candidate quotas on women’s representation in model 3 is predicted 
to be 3 percentage points (b-coefficient 3.3). Thus under the control for the structural and 
cultural factors contributing to the level of women’s representation year 2001, and under 
control for regime type, and electoral system the adoption of gender quota type legislated 
candidate has contributed to a three percentage points’ increase of the proportion of women in 
the national parliament 2011.  
 
In non-democratic regimes the impact of legislated candidate quotas is significant in both 
model 2 and 3. The adoption of legislated candidate quotas in non-democratic regimes has 
contributed to an additional approximately nine percentage points’ increase in the proportion 
of women MPs during the last ten years (b-coefficient in model 2 is 9.7 and in model 3 is 8.8). 
In other words: if two non-democratic countries had the same level of women MPs in 2001,  
have the same electoral system, but one country has legislated candidate quotas and the other 
country do not, the quota country is predicted to have 12
34
 percentage points more women in 
its national parliament today. The results contribute further to the confirmation of non-
democratic regimes’ possibility to change faster than the other regime types.  
 
By contrasting the results from legislated candidate quotas with those from voluntary party 
quotas my results furthermore confirms the previous empirical finding that the institutional 
character of the quota seem to be important for the impact on women’s representation 
(Dahlerup 2006, Htun and Jones 2003). Voluntary party quotas do not show any significant 
effects in any of the models’. Since voluntary party quotas and legislated candidate quotas are 
similar except for the legislative character, it seems to be important for the impact on 
women’s descriptive representation that the quota has some type of legislative character.  
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 3+9=12 percentage points (Effect from reserved seats + effect from the interaction of reserved seats and non-
democratic regime = total effect from non-democratic regimes having reserved seats) 
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4.2.3 Impact of Electoral system 
As expected PR electoral system has strong, significant impact on women’s representation in 
model 1’s cross-section analysis. Countries having PR electoral system is predicted to have 
approximately seven percentage points’ higher representation of women than countries with 
majority systems (b-coefficient 7.4).  
 
More surprisingly is however, that the impact of PR electoral system is not significant in 
model 2 and 3. My conclusion is that PR needs more time than ten years to have a significant 
impact on women’s descriptive representation. 
4.2.4 Lack of impact from structural and cultural factors 
Except from Protestantism which has a small significant impact in model 1, there are no 
significant effects from structural or cultural factors from the regression analysis. This result 
highlights the importance of the institutional factors to explain women’s representation.  
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5. DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS  
Below the conclusions from the statistical analysis will be discussed in relation to the research 
questions. Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s (2005) two ideal type tracks to women’s representation 
will be mention below. It could therefore be useful to remind the reader about the incremental 
and the fast track to women’s representation. The incremental track predicts women’s 
representation to be the outcome of a step-wise, time-consuming process where gender 
equality and the proportion of women MPs follow each other.  
 
The fast track to women’s representation predicts leaps in the number of women MPs as an 
effect from gender quotas. Women’s representation in national parliaments is according to the 
fast track ideal type, not an indication of gender equality or development, but rather the 
outcome of gender quotas. 
5.1 Which types of countries have gender quotas? 
The conclusions from the results confirm that all sorts of countries have gender quotas. The 
contribution of this thesis has been to present the country characteristics when the countries 
are grouped according to gender quota types. In the first section in the analysis, the results 
from the descriptive statistics indicates that it is important to separate the countries after 
gender quota type since the country characteristics to a large extent differs between the quota 
types. Since the findings shows that all types of countries have adopted gender quotas, it may 
be possible to generalize the results to countries adopting quotas in the future. Hence, the 
findings of this thesis are relevant for future research on the impact of gender quotas on 
women’s representation. 
5.2 Have gender quotas changed levels of women’s representation 
descriptive representation from 2001 to 2011? 
The results from the regression analysis illustrates it is important to consider which type of 
gender quota the country has. The voluntary party quotas do not contribute to the changed 
level of women’s representation 2001-2011, meanwhile legislated candidate quotas and 
reserved seats contribute to changed levels. But is it likely that countries adopting quotas 
today will experience the same impact on women’s representation the following decade? If 
nothing unexpected happens, then it is highly possible that the gender quota types will have 
the same effect in the future.  
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As for the lack of significant impact from voluntary party quotas on women’s descriptive 
representation, this is not particularly surprising. According to Matland (2006) most political 
parties adopt voluntary party quotas to signal to other parties as well as to other actors that 
they prioritize women’s representation and gender equality. Therefore, voluntary party quotas 
probably are more likely to have impact on women’s substantive representation. Hence, in the 
long run, the voluntary party quotas might have most impact on women’s representation.  
This is, however, an issue for future research to study.  
 
As the results in section 1 show, the majority of the countries with voluntary party quotas are 
closer to Dahlerup and Freidenvall’s incremental ideal type track to women’s representation, 
than to the fast track. For instance 82 percent of the countries with voluntary party quotas are 
democratic regimes (please see table 4.2), most countries are above the world mean HDI 
(please see figure 4.3). Hence, the results confirm the importance of separating voluntary 
party quotas from the two other types of quotas. The results also highlight the importance of 
continue to explain women’s representation in several countries in accordance with the 
conventional wisdom advanced by the incremental track. 
 
Legislated candidate quotas and reserves seats quotas have had a large impact on changed 
levels of women’s representation from 2001 to 2011. According to the predictions in table 
4.5, reserved seats seem to be a more powerful tool to increase the proportion of women MPs 
than legislated candidate quotas even if both quota types have impact. Hence, the results from 
the regression analysis highlights the importance of separating gender quotas that target the 
parliamentary (reserved seats) level of the electoral process, from the quotas targeting the 
candidate level (legislated party quotas).  
5.3 Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on 
regime type?
35
 
The results from the regression analysis revealed major impact of gender quotas on women’s 
representation in non-democratic regimes (as the reader recalls there were significant 
interaction effects from both reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas in non-democratic 
regimes). Considering the possibility to generalize the results to non-democratic regimes 
adopting gender quotas in the future, it is likely quotas will have the same impact. In other 
                                                 
35
 As the reader will recognize, I have allowed myself to include my personal perspective in this section. 
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words, if it is of interest to increase women’s descriptive representation reserved seats and 
legislated candidate quotas seem to be two appropriate alternatives. This thesis furthermore 
confirms the possibility to use reserved seats to increase women’s representation in other 
regimes as well. 
 
According to my opinion the results that the impact of gender quotas have been strongest in 
non-democratic regimes, is the most interesting observation made by this thesis. But what 
makes the finding so interesting? After all these women MPs probably lack substantial 
influence in these parliaments. 
 
First of all, Schwind-Bayer and Mishler’s (2005) integrated model argue the dimensions of 
representation should be understood in relation to each other. The authors suggest for instance 
that the formal representation have impact on the descriptive, the substantive and the 
symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:410). Even if Schwindt-Bayer 
and Mishler’s results are based on democratic regimes, their model offers an interesting 
aspect of the potential effects from the increased descriptive representation. So even if this 
thesis only control for the impact of quotas on women’s descriptive representation there is 
reason for future research to analyse the impact on the substantive and symbolic 
representation as well. 
 
Second, despite parliaments in non-democratic regimes in general are regarded as powerless, 
the presence of women could be important. Nanivadekar (2006:119) argue women’s 
representation could be important even in non-democratic regimes. For instance, women get 
experience from political work which could be useful if the country starts a democratization 
process: even if women MPs do not have any substantial power today, they are at least present 
in the parliament if the country takes a turn towards democratization.  
 
Furthermore, women MPs in non-democratic countries could serve several symbolic values. 
The presence of women may in the long run contribute to increased acceptance for women’s 
in politics. Thus increased number of women MPs may effect the perceptions of women’s role 
in society, i.e. the social norms. Personally, I do not think we should underestimate the 
importance of symbolic representation in this context. I believe the presence of women in 
parliament, for instance, may encourage younger generations of women to demand education 
on the same terms as their male friends. Women MPs may even inspire young women to take 
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part of workforce as well as the political life. Increased level of education, participations in 
workforce and political activism among women in developing countries have important 
impact on the national economy, child health, etc. 
 
The third reason why I find the results interesting is related to the political leaders in the non-
democratic regimes. Which are the reasons political leaders in no-democratic regimes approve 
of gender quotas, and how is this interesting for the research question? 
 
According to Tripp et al (2006) and Dahlerup (2006) increased proportion of women MPs are 
often perceived to be associated with democratization and a measure of development. These 
perceptions could be traced to the incremental track to women’s representation (Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall 2005). Hence, one possible explanation why the political leaders in non-
democratic regimes adopt gender quotas could be that non-democratic leaders associate 
increased levels of women MPs with democratization and choose the quotas as a tool to 
increase the democracy. There is also a chance that the political leaders actually want to 
involve more women in politics. If the political leaders adopt quotas to strengthen democracy 
or  to involve more women in politics, then it is likely that changed levels in women’s 
descriptive representation may have impact on women’s substantive representation. 
 
However, a more likely explanation would be that these leaders want to frame their countries 
as more gender equal and developed than they really are. If the reason why non-democratic 
political leaders adopt gender quotas, is to frame the country as more developed and gender-
equal than the country really is, it is less likely that the changed levels of women’s descriptive 
representation will have substantive impact. 
 
Furthermore, the political leaders in non-democratic regimes may have accepted gender 
quotas as a condition set by international loan givers, such as structural adjustment 
programmes. Then the international actors may have an important role if the increased levels 
of women’s descriptive representation will have effect on the substantive representation. 
 
The fourth reason why I find the results showing leaps in women’s descriptive representation 
in non-democratic parliaments as an outcome of gender quotas, is because the findings 
highlight the importance to consider the impact of quotas in studies of the link between 
women’s descriptive representation and substantive representation.  
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One example is research on women’s representation and level of corruption (Dollar et al 
2001, Sung 2003, also relevant Charron and Lapuente 2010). If the impact of gender quotas is 
not controlled for in such studies, the analysis may give misleading predictions. Since many 
non-democratic regimes have adopted gender quotas and experiences leaps in women’s 
descriptive representation, these countries have taken the so called fast track to high levels of 
women’s representation. Consequently, the predicted outcome of women’s descriptive 
representation needs to be analyzed separately from the predicted outcome in countries taken 
the incremental track to high levels of women MPs, since women’s representation measures 
two different things. Women’s descriptive representation should not be expected to have 
impact on the substantive representation in non-democratic regimes, as it is expected to have 
in democratic regimes (see for instance Wängnerud 2005).  
 
The fifth reason why I find the results so interesting is I believe the increased levels of 
women’s representation non-democratic regimes, is the importance of the international 
community to contribute to country-level changes. The widespread adoption of quotas 
occurred largely after Beijing 1995. Even if it is not directly controlled for in this thesis, it 
seems like the international agreement have had the intended impact.  
 
It is important, however, that the international community, women’s movements and the 
countries do not relax behind the veil of ignorance: women’s representation can no longer be 
understood in the same way as it used to. Today women’s representation needs to be 
understood from the two ideal type tracks developed by Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005). In 
countries taking the fast track to women’s representation the leaps in proportion of women is 
not an indication of strengthened rights of women or the outcome of societal development, 
nor an indication of improved gender-equality. Instead the presence of women in non-
democratic parliaments is nothing but numbers until empirical finding proves differently. 
Even if these countries have reached levels of women’s representation above the critical mass 
of 30 percent (Studlar and McAllister 2002, Wängnerud 2009), it would be highly unlikely 
that the women MPs would have as much influence over the policy process as the women in 
democratic countries taken the incremental track. The next task for the international 
community is to develop strategies how to conduct the presence of women in national 
parliaments in all regime types. To develop strategies encouraging countries to conduct the 
competence and experience these women have in non-democratic as well as democratic 
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regimes. To develop strategies supporting political leaders in non-democratic regimes to 
realise the values of taking the path leading towards democratization. 
 
It is also important to be aware of the fact that incremental track to women’s representation is 
still highly relevant. Hence, it is crucial to keep the conventional wisdom of women’s 
representation in mind as well. In other words: women’s representation today needs to be 
understood from the two ideal types advanced by Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) 
 
The concluding remarks summarizing this thesis are: Based on the findings in this thesis, 
gender quotas seem to be the mechanism bridging women over the troubled water of 
institutional, structural, and cultural barriers otherwise preventing them from political 
participation. At least in non-democratic regimes. 
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8. Appendix 
8.2 Women’s representation  
Table 8.1 Countries with more than 30 percent women MPs  
2001 and 2011. Quotas means that the country has gender quotas 
Rank  
Country, 2001         (%) 
2011 (%) 
1 Sweden qutas 42.7 Rwanda qutas 56.3 
2 Finland 36.5 Andorra  50.0 
3 Netherlands qutas 36.0 Cuba 45.2 
4 Norway qutas 35.8 Sweden qutas 44.7 
5 Iceland qutas 34.9 Seychelles 43.8 
6 Germany qutas 31.1 Finland 42.5 
7 New Zealand 30.8 South Africa 
qutas  
42.3 
8 Mozambique qutas 30.0 Netherlands qutas 40.7 
9  Nicaragua qutas 40.2 
10  Iceland qutas 39.7 
11  Norway qutas 39.6 
12  Mozambique 
qutas 
39.2 
13  Denmark qutas 39.1 
14  Costa Rica qutas 38.6 
15  Angola qutas 38.2 
16  Belgium qutas 38.0 
17  Argentina qutas 37.4 
18  Spain qutas 
Tanzania qutas 
36.0 
19  Uganda qutas 35.0 
20  Nepal qutas 33.2 
21  Germany qutas 32.9 
22  Ecuador qutas 
Timor-Leste/East 
Timor qutas 
32.3 
24  New Zealand 32.2 
  Slovenia qutas 32.2 
25  Belarus 31.8 
26  Guyana qutas 31.3 
27  The F.Y.R. of 
Macedonia qutas 
30.9 
28  Burundi qutas 30.5 
Source: IPU (2012) and Quotaproject (2012) 
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Table 8.2 Women’s representation 2011 (% women MPs in lower or single chamber) 
Country (% W) 
Rwanda 56.3 
Andorra 50.0 
Cuba 45.2 
Sweden 44.7 
Seychelles 43.8 
Finland 42.5 
South Africa 1 42.3 
Netherlands 40.7 
Nicaragua 40.2 
Iceland 39.7 
Norway 39.6 
Mozambique 39.2 
Denmark 39.1 
Costa Rica 38.6 
Angola 38.2 
Belgium 38.0 
Argentina 37.4 
Spain 36.0 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
36.0 
Uganda 35.0 
Nepal 33.2 
Germany 32.9 
Ecuador 32.3 
Timor-Leste 32.3 
New Zealand 32.2 
Slovenia 32.2 
Belarus 31.8 
Guyana 31.3 
The F.Y.R. of 
Macedonia 
30.9 
Burundi 30.5 
Portugal 28.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 28.6 
Switzerland 28.5 
Austria 27.9 
Ethiopia 27.8 
Afghanistan 27.7 
Tunisia 26.7 
South Sudan 26.5 
Mexico 26.2 
Bolivia 25.4 
Iraq 25.2 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
25.0 
Luxembourg 25.0 
Canada 24.8 
Australia 24.7 
Sudan 24.6 
Namibia 24.4 
Viet Nam 24.4 
Lesotho 24.2 
Liechtenstein 24.0 
Croatia 23.8 
Poland 23.7 
Kyrgyzstan 23.3 
Latvia 23.0 
Philippines 22.9 
Senegal 22.7 
Pakistan 22.5 
Malawi 22.3 
United Kingdom 22.3 
Singapore 22.2 
Mauritania 22.1 
Czech Republic 22.0 
Eritrea 22.0 
Serbia 22.0 
Uzbekistan 22.0 
Italy 21.6 
Peru 21.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21.4 
China 21.3 
Bulgaria 20.8 
Cape Verde 20.8 
Dominican Republic 20.8 
Cambodia 20.3 
Israel 20.0 
Estonia 19.8 
Republic of Moldova 19.8 
Bangladesh 19.7 
Honduras 19.5 
Lithuania 19.1 
El Salvador 19.0 
Monaco 19.0 
Tajikistan 19.0 
France 18.9 
Mauritius 18.8 
Greece 18.7 
San Marino 18.3 
Indonesia 18.2 
Sao Tome and Principe 18.2 
Kazakhstan 17.8 
United Arab Emirates 17.5 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
17.4 
Morocco 17.0 
Venezuela 17.0 
Turkmenistan 16.8 
United States of 
America 2 
16.8 
Saint Lucia 16.7 
Azerbaijan 16.0 
Slovakia 16.0 
Thailand 15.8 
Albania 15.7 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
15.6 
Burkina Faso 15.3 
Ireland 15.1 
Zimbabwe 15.0 
Republic of Korea 14.7 
Chile 14.2 
Gabon 14.2 
Turkey 14.2 
Cameroon 13.9 
Djibouti 13.8 
Russian Federation 13.6 
Swaziland 13.6 
Grenada 13.3 
Guatemala 13.3 
Niger 13.3 
Sierra Leone 12.9 
Chad 12.8 
Jamaica 12.7 
Central African 
Republic 
12.5 
Dominica 12.5 
Madagascar 12.5 
Paraguay 12.5 
Syrian Arab Republic 12.4 
Montenegro 12.3 
Bahamas 12.2 
Colombia 12.1 
Uruguay 12.1 
Suriname 11.8 
Zambia 11.5 
Romania 11.2 
Togo 11.1 
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Cote d'Ivoire 11.0 
India 11.0 
Japan 10.8 
Jordan 10.8 
Cyprus 10.7 
Antigua and Barbuda 10.5 
Malaysia 10.4 
Mali 10.2 
Bahrain 10.0 
Barbados 10.0 
Equatorial Guinea 10.0 
Guinea-Bissau 10.0 
Kenya 9.8 
Liberia 9.6 
Hungary 8.8 
Kiribati 8.7 
Malta 8.7 
Brazil 8.6 
Bhutan 8.5 
Panama 8.5 
Armenia 8.4 
Benin 8.4 
Ghana 8.3 
Algeria 8.0 
Ukraine 8.0 
Botswana 7.9 
Kuwait 7.7 
Libya 7.7 
Gambia 7.5 
Congo 7.3 
Nigeria 6.8 
Somalia 6.8 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 6.7 
Tuvalu 6.7 
Georgia 6.6 
Maldives 6.5 
Sri Lanka 5.8 
Haiti 4.2 
Samoa 4.1 
Mongolia 3.9 
Tonga 3.6 
Myanmar 3.5 
Lebanon 3.1 
Comoros 3.0 
Marshall Islands 3.0 
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
2.8 
Egypt 3 2.0 
Vanuatu 1.9 
Oman 1.2 
Papua New Guinea 0.9 
Yemen 0.3 
Belize 0.0 
Micronesia (Federated 
States of) 
0.0 
Nauru 0.0 
Palau 0.0 
Qatar 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 
Solomon Islands 0.0 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
? 
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Table 8.3 Women’s 
repersentation 2001 (% 
women MPs in lower or 
single chamber) 
2001 
Women in 
Parliament 
(%) 
 
Sweden 43,00 
Denmark 37,00 
Finland 37,00 
Netherlands 36,00 
Norway 36,00 
Iceland 35,00 
Germany 31,00 
New Zealand 31,00 
Mozambique 30,00 
South Africa 30,00 
Cuba 28,00 
Spain 28,00 
Argentina 27,00 
Austria 27,00 
Grenada 27,00 
Rwanda 26,00 
Vietnam 26,00 
Turkmenistan 26,00 
Namibia 25,00 
Seychelles 24,00 
Australia 23,00 
Belgium 23,00 
Switzerland 23,00 
China 22,00 
Monaco 22,00 
Canada 21,00 
Croatia 21,00 
Laos 21,00 
Korea, North 20,00 
Peru 20,00 
Costa Rica 19,00 
Guyana 19,00 
Estonia 18,00 
Uganda 18,00 
United Kingdom 18,00 
Botswana 17,00 
Latvia 17,00 
Luxembourg 17,00 
Portugal 17,00 
Angola 16,00 
Dominican 
Republic 
16,00 
Mexico 16,00 
Bahamas 15,00 
Czech Republic 15,00 
Ecuador 15,00 
Eritrea 15,00 
Tajikistan 15,00 
Burundi 14,00 
Slovakia 14,00 
United States 14,00 
Israel 13,00 
Jamaica 13,00 
Poland 13,00 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 
13,00 
San Marino 13,00 
Bolivia 12,00 
Colombia 12,00 
Congo 12,00 
Ireland 12,00 
Mali 12,00 
Senegal 12,00 
Slovenia 12,00 
Tunisia 12,00 
Uruguay 12,00 
Barbados 11,00 
Bulgaria 11,00 
Cape Verde 11,00 
Chile 11,00 
France 11,00 
Italy 11,00 
Lithuania 11,00 
Mongolia 11,00 
Philippines 11,00 
Romania 11,00 
St Lucia 11,00 
El Salvador 10,00 
Kazakhstan 10,00 
Malaysia 10,00 
Nicaragua 10,00 
Panama 10,00 
Syria 10,00 
Venezuela 10,00 
Zambia 10,00 
Bangladesh 9,00 
Bhutan 9,00 
Gabon 9,00 
Greece 9,00 
Guatemala 9,00 
Guinea 9,00 
Honduras 9,00 
India 9,00 
Malawi 9,00 
Malta 9,00 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
9,00 
Sierra Leone 9,00 
Zimbabwe 9,00 
Ethiopia (1993-) 8,00 
Hungary 8,00 
Indonesia 8,00 
Iraq 8,00 
Liberia 8,00 
Madagascar 8,00 
Moldova 8,00 
Guinea-Bissau 8,00 
Russia 8,00 
Ukraine 8,00 
Burkina Faso 8,00 
Samoa 8,00 
Andorra 7,00 
Belize 7,00 
Cambodia 7,00 
Central African 
Republic 
7,00 
Cyprus 7,00 
Georgia 7,00 
Japan 7,00 
Singapore 7,00 
Macedonia 7,00 
Uzbekistan 7,00 
Brazil 6,00 
Cameroon 6,00 
Benin 6,00 
Korea, South 6,00 
Maldives 6,00 
Mauritius 6,00 
Nepal 6,00 
Albania 5,00 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
5,00 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
5,00 
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Kiribati 5,00 
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
5,00 
Togo 5,00 
Kenya 4,00 
Lesotho 4,00 
Liechtenstein 4,00 
Mauritania 4,00 
Turkey 4,00 
Algeria 3,00 
Armenia 3,00 
Iran 3,00 
Nigeria 3,00 
Marshall Islands 3,00 
Paraguay 3,00 
Swaziland 3,00 
Solomon Islands 2,00 
Chad 2,00 
Gambia 2,00 
Kyrgyzstan 2,00 
Lebanon 2,00 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2,00 
Morocco 1,00 
Niger 1,00 
Yemen 1,00 
Djibouti 0,00 
Jordan 0,00 
Kuwait 0,00 
Vanuatu 0,00 
Micronesia 0,00 
Tonga 0,00 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0,00 
8.2 Gender Quotas 
8.2.1 The history of gender quota types 
The last decade’s there has been increased attention towards gender quotas in the literature on 
women’s representation. As already mentioned, there are 106 countries have gender quotas at 
the moment (Quotaproject 2012, Dahlerup 2007:73). Gender quotas are not such a new 
phenomenon.
36
 The reserved seats quotas emerged as early as the 1930s, and were the most 
common type of gender quotas during the 1970s. However, reserved seats lost popularity after 
the 1970s, and did not regain its popularity until the beginning of the 2000s. It is primarily 
semi- and non-democratic regimes with traditionally low levels of women MPs that have 
adopted reserved seats (Krook 2009:7).  
 
Replacing reserved seats as the most common type of gender quotas after the 1970s was the 
voluntary type. Voluntary party quotas emerged in the mid-1970s when the Norwegian 
Labour party adopted internal quota regulation with the ambition to increase the number of 
women in the parliament (Caul 2001:1214). The Norwegian example inspired other countries 
to consider gender quotas with the purpose of increasing women’s representation (Tripp and 
Kang 2008:339).  
 
Legislated candidate quotas is the newest type of quota, and was first introduced in Argentina 
in 1991, as a response to intense work by women in political parties and women’s 
organisations in the civil society (Francheschet and Piscopo 2012:44). Legislated candidate 
quotas gained popularity in Latin America during the late 1990s, and has spread globally ever 
since. 
  
                                                 
36 During the period 1985-1995, 21 countries adopted some type of gender quotas. In the meantime, however, 
25 former Soviet republics dropped their gender quotas. These 25 countries include: Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Latvia, Poland. The F.Y.R Macedonia, Estonia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Slovenia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, 
Georgia, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan (Tripp and Kang 2008:359). 
This thesis will not pay particular attention towards the fact that the former Soviet republics dropped their 
quotas. 
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8.2.2 25 former Soviet republics removed gender quotas: 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Latvia, Poland. The F.Y.R Macedonia, Estonia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Slovenia, 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Georgia, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan (Tripp and Kang 2008:359). 
 
8.2.3 Countries having Reserved Seats Quota 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, China, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Niger, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Quotaproject 2012). 
 
8.2.4 Countries having Legislated Candidate Quotas 
Albania,  Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso,  
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, East Timon, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, South Korea, Macedonia, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, Uruguay, Uzbekistan (Quotaproject 2012). 
 
8.2.5 Countries having Voluntary Party Quotas 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, Kenya, Korea South, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zimbabwe (Quotaproject 2012). 
 
Table 8.4 Regime Type and Gender Quotas (number of countries) 
Type of quota Democratic 
Semi-
Democratic 
Non-
Democratic 
Total 
number 
of 
countries 
Reserved seats 0 6 9 15 
Legislated candidate quotas 20 5 6 31 
Voluntary party quotas 37 4 4 45 
Comments: The table illustrates how many countries that have gender are considered to be democratic, semi-
democratic, or non-democratic regimes. The countries are divided in accordance with which quota type they 
have adopted. The variable values equal the number of countries in that specific category having a certain regime 
type. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas are 
based on Dahleru’s categorization on quotaproject.org. The total number of countries illustrates how many 
countries that have a value on the regime type variable. Regime type is based on Freedom House measure of 
democracy index where I have categorized the values 7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic 
regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic regimes.  Source: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see 
codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Regime type: QoG 2012 
fh_ipolity2. 
 
Table 8.5 Institutional factors: Distribution quota type and electoral system  
(number of countries) 
Type of quota PR Majority Mixed N 
Reserved seats 3 10 2 15 
Legislated candidate quotas 19 5 13 37 
Voluntary party quotas 20 9 18 47 
Comment: The table shows how many countries have the different quota types. Source: Electoral system, QoG 
cross-section 2011 variable iaep_es. Plurality and majority electoral system are both coded as ‘Majority’. 
Quotas: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the 
variables are coded.  
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Table 8.6 Structural Factors:  Quota type and Women’s political and economic rights 
Type of quota 
No 
political 
rights 
Full 
political 
rights 
No 
economic 
rights 
Full economic 
rights 
Total 
number 
of 
countries 
Reserved seats 1 0 2 0 15 
Legislated candidate quotas 0 4 1 0 39 
Voluntary party quotas 0 13 0 1 50 
World 5 21 7 3 193 
Comment: The  ciri_wopol, and ciri_wecon in QoG standard dataset (2011) 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Structural factors: Quota type women’s education  
 
 
Table 8.7 Average years of education and Quota Type 
Type of quota 
Average level of 
women’s education 
Reserved seats 2.9 years 
Legislated candidate quotas 6.7 years 
Voluntary party quotas 8.0 years 
World 6.8 years 
Comment: The table illustrates the average number of years women have studied in the countries.The countries 
are categorised after gender quota type belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, 
legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. The 
world average is based on the countries included in the QoG standard dataset (2011). Sources: Quota variables: 
Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are 
coded. Electoral system: QoG Standard dataset, cross-section 2011 variabel iaep_es. Women’s education: QoG 
Standard dataset (2011) variable ihme_ayef.  
 
  
Average of women’s education (years)
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Table 8.8 Distribution of countries, grouped after quota type, and HDI dichotomous 
variable 
Type of quota 
HDI above 
world 
average  
HDI below 
world 
average  
Total percent 
(%) 
Reserved seats 20 80 100 
Legislated party quotas 30 70 100 
Voluntary party quotas 70 30 100 
World 62 38 100 
Comment: Table x.x illustrates the dichotomous version of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). The 
HDI is divided in two halves of each side of the world average HDI of 0.7. The countries are categorised after 
gender quota type belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and 
voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup’s categorization on quotaproject.org. The category World represents 
all of the world’s countries that are included in this thesis. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, 
please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. HDI is based on 
undp_hdi found in the QoG standard dataset (2011). 
 
8.3 Databases 
The QoG database is created by the Quality of Government institute at the University of 
Gothenburg. All information about the QoG institute is taken from the QoG webpage: 
 
 
“The QoG Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an 
independet research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. We 
conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of 
Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. 
Our research addresses the questions of how to create and maintain high quality government institutions and how 
the quality of such institutions influences public policy and socio-economic conditions in a broader sense. While 
Quality of Government is our common intellectual focal point, we apply a variety of theoretical and 
methodological perspectives. Around twenty-five researchers are currently engaged in different projects 
organized or funded by the QoG Institute. A central part of establishing the QoG Institute has been the 
construction of a comparative data base and we believe that we now have the most complete data set pertaining 
to this type of research.” (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/aboutus/) 
The Quotaproject database is the result from cooperation between the International IDEA, the 
IPU, and the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University. All information below 
is taken from the Quotaproject website (http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutProject.cfm)  
 
 
International IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. IDEA 
undertakes its work through providing comparative knowledge resources and tools, influencing policy and 
politics, and support democratic reforms. This is done in electoral processes, constitution building processes, 
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political participation and representation, democracy and development, gender in democracy, democracy 
assessments and addressing crosscutting issues on conflict, security, diversity and gender. 
 
The IPU is the international organization of Parliaments, established in 1889. The Union is the focal point for 
world-wide parliamentary dialogue and works for peace and co-operation among peoples and for the firm 
establishment of representative democracy. It seeks to foster contacts, co-ordination, and the exchange of 
experience among parliaments and parliamentarians of all countries. 
 
At the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, Drude Dahlerup is heading a research project 
entitled: "Quotas - a Key to Equality? An International Comparison of the Use of Electoral Quotas to obtain 
Equal Political Citizenship for Women". The project is supported by the Swedish Research Council. 
 
